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eXeCutiVe summary
Violent xenophobia has become a regular feature of South African life. Everyday animosity frequently spills over into violence against 
individual migrants and refugees and their economic enterprises. Some 
of these incidents reach the scrutiny of the media and officialdom, but 
most remain invisible and unremarked. The fact that most of the violence 
occurs in marginal urban locations of informal settlements, townships and 
inner-city suburbs in South Africa has prompted intense debate over the 
nomenclature and identification of the underlying causes. Explanations for 
the large-scale anti-migrant violence that swept the country in May 2008, 
and continues in more isolated and sporadic fashion through to the present 
day, fall into three general categories: “xenophobia denialism”, “xenophobia 
minimalism” and “xenophobia realism.” 
The denialists reject the argument that xenophobia plays any role in 
violence against migrants and refugees. The South African government, 
initially bewildered by the unexpectedness and ferocity of the May 2008 
violence, settled on an official position that the deaths, destruction and 
displacement were the work of criminal elements in the affected areas. This 
argument that attacks on migrants and refugees are simply acts of criminal-
ity, not xenophobia, is now state orthodoxy. Xenophobia denialism has also 
shaped official South African responses to criticism from the international 
community. Violence perpetrated by the police and South African citizens 
continues to be explained away by politicians as criminal acts by isolated, 
anti-social elements. The government’s position has been echoed by some 
researchers and political commentators who suggest that only a very small 
group of individuals engage in such acts and that these are not symptomatic 
of wider prejudice against migrants within South African society.
Another form of denialism shifts the blame from xenophobia to the 
state’s dereliction of its duties, particularly its failure to control borders. 
According to this view, the problem is that the state has not seriously 
engaged with the “foreign threat.” It is difficult to see how South Africa’s 
draconian border and immigration controls can be considered either soft 
or lenient. The post-apartheid state has intensified border and immigration 
enforcement and, even at the height of the 2008 violence, officials were 
deporting displaced victims they claimed had entered South Africa ille-
gally. State agencies have typically focused on identifying irregular migrants 
among victims of violence and deporting them, reinforcing the biases and 
prejudices that fuelled the violence to begin with. 
The xenophobia minimalists also eschew it as an explanation for 
violence against migrants and refugees, seeing it instead as an epiphe-
nomenon or symptom of a deeper malaise. This is a particularly prevalent 
tendency amongst neo-marxist scholars seeking a materialist explanation 
for the violence, which they view as the outworking of structural economic 
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inequalities and the capture of the African National Congress by neo-
liberalism, with the consequent inability of the state to effect a fundamental 
transformation and redistribution of wealth and resources in the country. 
The minimalists essentially argue that although xenophobia might exist, it 
is an epiphenomenon that does not get at the root causes of violence. One 
strand of minimalism sees the violence as a signifier of a broader, deepening 
social crisis in South Africa tied to intense competition for scarce resources 
such as jobs, shelter and services. According to this view, the effects of 
the inadequate post-apartheid transition have been felt most acutely in 
marginal urban locations where much of the violence has occurred and 
where difference has become the site around which the palpable anger and 
frustrations of those left out has been expressed.
Certainly, the spatial incidence of violence in May 2008 was strongly 
correlated with the geography of poverty. But this simply begs the question 
of why not all poor areas (including many in which migrants and refugees 
resided) erupted or why poor South Africans were not attacking each other 
with similar ferocity. The economic insecurity of the offenders may account 
for their extreme anxiety and heightened dissatisfaction, but it does not 
explain why only certain groups were and are singled out for deadly assault. 
Furthermore, if economic competition between poor residents and migrants 
is the underlying cause of aggressive hostility, it does not explain why 
wealthy and privileged groups, who do not face direct or even indirect com-
petition from these migrants, also espouse these prejudices. When vicious 
attacks on migrants are conceived primarily as the outcome of material 
realities and economic competition between citizens and “foreigners”, then 
the frames of reference are automatically loaded against the latter. Seen in 
such terms, resentment and antipathy towards migrants and other outsid-
ers become inevitable aspects of the social landscape, justifying stringent 
controls over immigration, and exclusion (or at best very limited inclusion) 
of migrants. This distinction invigorates the very idea that the presence of 
migrants and refugees poses a perpetual threat to “legitimate insiders”. 
Similarly, the crises of governance and frustrated hopes in South Africa, 
particularly at local levels, have little if anything to do with the presence 
of migrants. These connections need to be constructed more carefully to 
avoid reproducing the very prejudices that need to be confronted. One 
cannot deny that there is rivalry between locals and migrants. However, 
migrants represent a very small minority in terms of South Africa’s total 
population, and the detrimental effects of this economic competition have 
been seriously overstated. 
Both xenophobia denialism and xenophobia minimalism ignore or 
sideline the evidence that most South Africans hold extremely negative 
views about migrants and refugees and want the state to exercise greater 
coercive power to purge the country of their presence. The realists suggest, 
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by contrast, that xenophobia is a pervasive phenomenon throughout South 
African society and that there is a predisposition to resort to violence on 
the part of a considerable number of South Africans. This viewpoint is 
based on systematic representative sampling of the South African popula-
tion as a whole. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) has 
been monitoring the perceptions and attitudes of South Africans towards 
migrants and refugees since the late 1990s. These periodic surveys provide 
unequivocal evidence of deep-rooted and pervasive hostility and animosity 
towards migrants and refugees in the country. 
Three general findings are of relevance to our argument: (a) the nature 
and strength of myths about migrant and migration; (b) the level of public 
endorsement of coercive state measures to keep migrants out of the country 
and to remove those who are present; and (c) the degree of willingness to 
resort to coercion and violence against migrants. 
In this paper, we argue that xenophobia realism is the best way to make 
sense of the phenomenon of extreme xenophobia, that is, the translation 
of hostile attitudes into violent actions. We conceptualize extreme xeno-
phobia as a heightened form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposi-
tion to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is strongly embedded 
and expressed through aggressive acts directed at migrants and refugees. 
South Africans hold migrants responsible for crime, bringing disease, and 
“stealing” jobs, services and resources and view them as being illegally in 
the country. Moreover, perceptions of a rapid increase in the number of 
migrants intensify the levels of threat attached to them. Rights and entitle-
ments for residents are directly and in a discriminatory fashion linked to 
migration and citizenship status, drawing the boundaries between those 
who are seen to belong and others who are not. High levels of migrant 
antipathy lead to recurrent episodes of violence. The primary challenge for 
xenophobia realists is to explain why, if hostility is so widespread, violence 
tends to be more confined, targeted at poorer neighbourhoods in the cit-
ies. First, whether and where animosity translates into actions depends on 
community-specific dynamics such as the nature of local leadership, the 
absence of dispute resolution mechanisms and the character of policing. 
Second, all of the common myths about migrants are offered by residents to 
explain why the attacks take place. Migration myths are not epiphenomena 
or post-hoc rationalizations; they have powerful mobilizing and animating 
effects spurring those who believe them into acts of extreme xenophobia. 
Disowning the existence of xenophobia not only flies in the face of a large 
body of quantitative and qualitative research, it illustrates a continuing lack 
of political will to own the problem and act against one of the most destruc-
tive and anti-democratic forces in post-apartheid South Africa.
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introDuCtion
The plague of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa has been variously labelled the “dark side of democracy”,1 a “new pathology”,2 
“apartheid vertigo”3 and evidence of the “demonic” nature of South Afri-
can society.4 Such arresting images seek to represent a deeply troubling 
reality manifested in the hostility, discrimination and alienation endured by 
African migrants and refugees in the country.5 Everyday animosity regularly 
spills over into violence against individual migrants and refugees and their 
economic enterprises.6 Some of these incidents reach the scrutiny of the 
media and officialdom, but most remain invisible and unremarked. The 
involvement of state functionaries in violence against migrants has also 
been well-documented.7 One recent study suggests that there are striking 
parallels and inter-connections between police actions and popular vio-
lence against migrants.8 According to the study’s author, the police regu-
larly engage in high-profile but ultimately ineffectual campaigns to purge 
cities of migrants. The public not only approves of these actions, but seeks 
to imitate them when police campaigns fail (as they usually do). 
Police sweeps are seen by government as a perfectly legitimate tactic 
to rid the country of “illegal foreigners” (in the language of the Immigra-
tion Act). However, it can be less sanguine about egregious cases of police 
brutality when they come to wider public attention. For example, in 1998, 
six white officers of the South African Police Services (SAPS) East Rand 
Dog Unit set attack dogs on three Mozambican migrants who were badly 
mauled and then physically and verbally abused (Figure 1).9 The incident 
was recorded in a police “training video” and later televised nationally and 
internationally. Condemned by government as evidence of the persistence 
of racism in post-apartheid South Africa, and by the trial judge as a “callous, 
cowardly, brutal and cruel” act, all six officers were sentenced to jail terms 
of between four and seven years. Fifteen years later, in February 2013, eight 
black members of the SAPS arrested a 27-year old Mozambican taxi-driver, 
Mido Macia, handcuffed him to the back of a police van and dragged him 
through the streets of Daveyton near Johannesburg in full view of a large 
crowd of onlookers.10 Macia died in police custody several hours later. The 
official response to this case had echoes of the first fifteen years earlier. The 
assault and murder of Macia was perpetrated by black officers and could 
not be interpreted as evidence of racism in the police services. But, like the 
incident in 1998, it was not seen as xenophobic either. In both cases, the 
xenophobic content of the attacks was downplayed and they were instead 
portrayed as “isolated” incidents perpetrated by “rogue individuals” (Figure 
2). To acknowledge that they were evidence of a deep-rooted, systemic and 
enduring problem would mean that the state would have to face up to the 
entrenched nature of xenophobia in the country rather than throwing the 
book at the few perpetrators who happen to be caught on video. 
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Figure 1: East Rand Dog Unit, 1998
© 2000 Zapiro (All Rights Reserved). Printed/Used with permission from www.zapiro.com
Figure 2: Murder of Mido Macia, 2013 
© 2013 Zapiro (All Rights Reserved). Printed/Used with permission from www.zapiro.com
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The large-scale xenophobic violence that swept South Africa in May 
2008 could not so easily be written off as the actions of isolated individu-
als, however. Mobs of South Africans with makeshift weapons rampaged 
through residential areas in a number of different cities for over a week. 
They targeted the properties and businesses of migrants and refugees in 
their communities causing widespread destruction. Individuals and whole 
families were attacked and in one particularly shocking incident, a Mozam-
bican man was burned alive. The victims fled their communities en masse 
and took refuge in tent camps. An estimated 100,000 men, women and 
children were displaced, 30,000 residential properties were destroyed, over 
600 people were seriously injured and over 60 were murdered. While the 
police did not directly participate in the looting and killing, critics have 
charged that they were largely indifferent to the mayhem. One commenta-
tor argues that “the relationship between policing practices and the mob 
violence was, from the start, a close, if mercurial, one.”11 
A recurring pattern of aggression against migrants and refugees contin-
ued after May 2008.12 In 2009, for example, some 3,000 Zimbabweans were 
forcibly displaced from the farming region of De Doorns in the Western 
Cape.13 During 2012, 238 incidents were recorded by the UNHCR with 
120 deaths and 7,500 persons displaced. In recent years, migrant entre-
preneurs, particularly from Somali and Ethiopian refugee communities, 
have been widely targeted.14 An estimated 120 Somali and 50 Bangladeshi 
shopkeepers were killed in townships in 2012. The UNHCR estimates that 
62 migrants were murdered in South Africa during the first six months of 
2013 and around 130 separate episodes of attacks on foreign migrants were 
reported. This exclusionary violence resulted in the displacement of some 
5,000 persons and left 73 persons seriously wounded. Violent xenophobia 
has thus become a regular feature of South African life. One migrant 
rights group notes that while xenophobic violence has not declined, many 
incidents are no longer being included in press reportage, conveying the 
erroneous impression that “xenophobia was no longer a problem.”15
The fact that most of the violence occurs in marginal urban locations 
of informal settlements, townships, and inner-city suburbs has prompted 
intense debate over the nomenclature and identification of the underlying 
cause(s). Explanations for the events of May 2008 fall into three general 
categories: what we call “xenophobia denialism”, “xenophobia minimal-
ism” and “xenophobia realism”. The denialists reject the argument that 
xenophobia plays any role in violence against migrants and refugees. The 
minimalists argue that although xenophobia might exist, it is an epiphe-
nomenon which does not get at the root causes of violence. The realists 
suggest that xenophobia is a pervasive phenomenon throughout South 
African society and that there is a predisposition to resort to violence on 
the part of a considerable number of South Africans. 
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In a previous study, we highlighted some of the key characteristics of 
contemporary forms of xenophobia.16 Drawing on examples from diverse 
national contexts in the global North and South, we broadened the defi-
nition of xenophobia from “dislike or fear of foreigners” to include other 
important dimensions. At the outset, xenophobia consists of highly nega-
tive perceptions of non-citizen groups on the basis of their citizenship and 
foreign origin. Xenophobia is disseminated through public discourses that 
repeatedly denigrate migrants and refugees by making them easy scapegoats 
for various problems and challenges faced by the receiving society. Xeno-
phobia is not simply about negative attitudes held by citizens, politicians 
and state officials. Hostile and distorted perceptions of migrants and refu-
gees usually combine with discriminatory practices and shoddy treatment 
of such groups by citizens and state institutions. Violence against migrants 
represents escalating and extreme manifestations of xenophobia.
In this paper, we conceptualize “extreme xenophobia” as a heightened 
form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived 
as outsiders and foreigners is strongly embedded and expressed through 
aggressive acts directed at migrants and refugees. The antipathy to migrants 
and refugees is acute and the threat perception attached to their presence 
is glaring and intense, influenced by many myths and biases. Citizens hold 
migrants responsible for crime, bringing disease, and “stealing” jobs, services 
and resources and view them as being “illegally” in the country. Perceptions 
of a rapid increase in the number of migrants intensify the levels of threat 
attached to them. Rights and entitlements for residents are directly and 
in a discriminatory fashion linked to citizenship, drawing the boundaries 
between those who are seen to belong and others who are not. High levels 
of migrant antipathy lead to recurrent episodes of violence. 
In South Africa, extreme xenophobia assumes many connected forms 
that are not simply about the dislike of all migrants. Instead, contempt is 
reserved for certain kinds of migrants, especially those from other African 
countries. Migrants from African countries with common ethnic and cul-
tural characteristics to South Africans (such as Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland) are tolerated to a degree. But those from most other African 
countries are loathed by the majority of South Africans, with particular 
opprobrium reserved for Zimbabweans, Nigerians and Somalis. Extreme 
xenophobia promotes negative stereotypes, which view poorer migrants as 
“criminals” and “anti-social” elements; incorporates very strong elements of 
fear and anxiety over the presence of migrants and their presumed negative 
social and economic effects on the citizenry; asserts the superiority of South 
Africans and inferiority of migrant groups; and manifests in acts of violence 
and wanton brutality against migrants and refugees.
The policies and practices of state institutions reinforce extreme xeno-
phobia by undermining rights and aggravating insecurity. In South Africa, 
this involves verbal abuse, harassment and extortion of migrants and refu-
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gees by the police and officials in charge of immigration and other govern-
ment agencies. Inflammatory speeches and comments about migrants and 
their activities by politicians and government officials harden mythologies. 
Policies actively diminishing rights and entitlements for migrants and refu-
gees strengthen institutionalized discrimination and widen the gap between 
citizens and migrants. Failure to protect migrants’ lives and property by 
police and other government personnel during physical attacks inevitably 
marks them out as “soft targets”, worsening their vulnerability to citizen 
aggression. The prosecution of perpetrators is non-existent or inadequate, 
leading to a culture of impunity. As we show in this paper, xenophobic 
discourse frequently exaggerates numbers and homogenizes and typecasts 
unwanted migrants into a small number of categories. Until recently, they 
were generally referred to as “illegal aliens” but this term has fallen into 
disuse with the 2002 Immigration Act which rebranded them as “illegal 
foreigners.” 
In practice, South Africa’s migrant stock consists of a complex variety of 
different groups. First, there are Europeans (mainly from the UK, Germany 
and Netherlands) who immigrated in the apartheid period. Immigration 
from Europe all but ended after the fall of apartheid. Second, there are 
migrants who come to work on South Africa’s mines and farms under con-
tract. This migrant labour system has existed for decades and has outlived 
the end of apartheid. Third, there are temporary migrants who enter the 
country of their own accord (mainly from neighbouring states and often 
irregularly) to work in sectors such as services, construction and agriculture 
or in the informal economy of South Africa’s large cities. Fourth, there are 
professionals, skilled migrants and students who come on temporary resi-
dence or work permits and are increasingly from other African countries. 
Finally, there are forced migrants who come from some of Africa’s crisis 
states in search of asylum (particularly the DRC, Somalia and Zimbabwe.)
XenoPhobia Denialism
Xenophobia denialism is exemplified by the official response of the South African state to the May 2008 attacks on migrants and refugees which 
refuted that they were motivated by xenophobia or that xenophobia even 
existed at all (Figure 3). As then President Thabo Mbeki publically stated 
in an address to commemorate the victims of the attacks, he had never 
met a xenophobic South African and anyone who called South Africans 
xenophobic was themself guilty of xenophobia: “None in our society has 
any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked 
criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia.”17 The argument 
that attacks on migrants and refugees are acts of criminality, not xenopho-
bia, became state orthodoxy long after the man himself was stripped of the 
Presidency by his own party. In 2010, for example, the Minister of Police 
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characterized attacks against migrants as “crimes of opportunity” where 
criminal or anti-social elements take advantage of the situation to engage 
in such misdeeds.18 After a Zimbabwean man was stoned to death in Lim-
popo in 2011, police spokesperson, Zweli Mnisi, echoed this view: “Once 
you start talking about xenophobia and Afrophobia, you are talking about 
semantics. It (the crimes against foreigners) is crime disguised under xenopho-
bia [emphasis ours].”19 On another occasion, Mnisi is quoted as saying that 
“holistically speaking, South Africans are not xenophobic and many cases 
are merely crime.”20 
These views on the causes of violence against migrants and refugees 
come from the highest levels of the South African government. In mid-
2013, for example, following an upsurge of violent assaults on Somali 
shop-owners, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, 
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, announced that “the looting, displacement and 
killing of foreign nationals in South Africa should not be viewed as xeno-
phobic attacks, but opportunistic criminal acts that have the potential to 
undermine the unity and cohesiveness of our communities.”21 The Cabinet 
also issued a public statement on the violence calling on communities to be 
vigilant against “the possible resurgence of criminal violence targeting for-
eign nationals.”22 The statement continued that “Cabinet is cautious not 
to label this violence as xenophobia because preliminary evidence indicates 
that these acts may be driven primarily by criminality.”  
Figure 3: Xenophobia Denialism
© 2013 Zapiro (All Rights Reserved). Printed/Used with permission from www.zapiro.com
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Xenophobia denialism has also shaped official South African responses 
to criticism from the international community. In 2006, for example, the 
African Union’s African Peer Review Mechanism’s (APRM) report pointed 
out that xenophobia was a serious issue for South Africa and urged the 
government to tackle it through concerted action.23 After his country 
visit to South Africa in 2011, the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights of Migrants similarly urged the South African govern-
ment to implement much-needed efforts to safeguard migrant rights, and 
improve their limited assimilation into South African society.24 A review of 
the government response to the APRM report argued that official efforts 
to address xenophobia were weak and diluted further by attempts to reject 
its very existence.25 Xenophobic violence perpetrated by agents of the state 
and South African citizens continue to be explained away by politicians as 
criminal acts by isolated, anti-social elements. 
The government’s position on xenophobic violence has been echoed by 
some researchers and political commentators. An article from the Institute 
of Security Studies, for example, notes that “these acts are indeed criminal 
activities: robberies under the guise of xenophobia.”26 Others have sug-
gested that only a very small group of individuals engage in such acts and 
that these episodes are not symptomatic of prejudice against migrants at 
large within South African society:
We must ask ourselves whether xenophobia is perhaps a label 
we have slapped on a phenomenon that has been inadequately 
analyzed or understood. Are our beliefs around xenophobia just 
lazy thinking? Do we really collectively hate outsiders to the 
extent that we are willing to murder them, loot their businesses 
and homes and go so far as to set them on fire...Were we a truly 
xenophobic nation then the phenomenon would manifest across 
all sectors of the population – across different races, different 
classes, and different neighbourhoods.27 
In other words, according to this view, South Africa can only really be 
considered a “xenophobic nation” when all sections of society engage in 
violence against migrants and refugees. 
A variant of this argument deploys the term “innocent violence” to sug-
gest that in the “profoundly and multi-variously lawless” spaces of urban 
South Africa, anti-migrant sentiments coalesce seamlessly with “a mix of 
motivations and multitude of rationales” to produce violence.28 The “night-
mare of a struggle for survival” has been turned into the violent exclusion of 
those who are even more defenceless than indigent citizens. This suggests 
that the principal motivation for the violence was looting, and “outsiders” 
were “the most convenient target, not because they were especially hated.” 
The perpetrators supposedly chose to cloak their criminality in anti-migrant 
terms in order to gather local support for their actions.
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Another form of denialism was articulated by the Human Sciences 
Research Council which shifted the blame for the violence of May 2008 
from xenophobia to the state’s dereliction of its duties and, in particular, 
its failure to control the country’s borders: “It is essential that government 
move urgently and effectively to protect South Africa’s borders and points-
of-entry. No migration policy or strategy aimed at alleviating xenophobic 
tensions can be contemplated if the national borders are porous and people 
can come and go as they please.”29 In this view, violence against migrants 
is the natural consequence of a failure by the state to control migration. 
Others have also blamed the failures of the South African government 
to participate in “effective physical monitoring and control of its land 
borders.” The problem, according to this view, is that the state has not 
seriously engaged with the “foreign threat” and does not “see any reason to 
keep people out, not even when uncounted numbers of Zimbabweans are 
fleeing the insupportable situation in their country.”30 
It is difficult to comprehend how South Africa’s draconian border 
and immigration controls can be considered soft or lenient. Intensified 
border and immigration enforcement has been a priority concern for the 
post-apartheid state.31 At the height of the violence in May 2008, officials 
were still trying to deport displaced victims they claimed had entered 
South Africa illegally. State agencies have typically focused on identifying 
irregular migrants among victims of violence and then deporting them, 
reinforcing the biases and prejudices which fuelled the violence to begin 
with. Even the Parliamentary Task Team assigned to investigate the events 
of May 2008 recommended that displaced migrants from affected areas who 
were in an irregular situation should be deported.32 Rates of detention and 
deportation of migrants have been exceptionally high, comparable only to 
enforcement in Western countries such as the United States, that spend 
significantly more on deterrent measures. Deportation levels rose from 
91,000 in 1994 to nearly 300,000 in 2008. Between 1994 and 2004, an 
average of 127,000 migrants were deported annually.33 
XenoPhobia minimalism 
A number of academic commentators argue that while xenophobia may exist, it cannot be invoked to explain violence against foreigners by 
South Africans. One study contends that the term “xenophobic violence” 
assumes a taken-for-granted hostile opposition between foreigners and 
South Africans even though the aggression has been leveled at citizens 
too in particular areas.34 The term supposedly holds a “certain descriptive 
plausibility” but ultimately fails to evaluate in a compelling manner the 
processes at play and, more importantly, how to handle them. Thus the 
relationship between South Africans and non-South Africans cannot be 
Xenophobic Violence in South AfricA: DeniAliSm, minimAliSm, reAliSm
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understood purely as one of unyielding antagonism under all circumstanc-
es.35 Another suggests that violence against migrant shopkeepers cannot 
be seen as xenophobic because South African shopkeepers are equally at 
risk.36 
Other minimalists take a similar view. The Council of Anthropologists 
of Southern Africa suggests that “contrary to the current South African 
and international political consensus, the presence of people who are 
deemed to be ethnically, racially or nationally different is not at the core of 
the problem.”37 Another study argues that xenophobia is “more symptom 
than cause” of a profound social disorder, pointing instead to what it calls a 
wide range of intersecting conditions (“the causal high-pressure systems” in 
South Africa’s post-apartheid trajectory) that manufactured the violence of 
May 2008.38 An edited book released shortly after May 2008 proposed that 
“xenophobia is too easy a label” to encapsulate this “shocking moment” in 
the nation’s history, making the term a convenient alibi for a “much more 
profound social and political malaise.”39 The volume’s editors go on to 
assert that xenophobia was a “secondary symptom” rather than the primary 
cause of the violence. 
One strand of minimalism sees the violence as a signifier of a broader, 
deepening social crisis in South Africa tied to the incomplete (some would 
say botched) post-apartheid project of equality and access for the disenfran-
chised black majority and intense competition for scarce resources (such as 
jobs, shelter and services). According to this view, the effects of the inad-
equate transition have been felt most acutely in marginal urban locations 
where much of the violence has occurred and where difference has become 
the site around which the palpable anger and frustrations of those left out 
has been expressed. One contributor to the aforementioned book argues 
that a “simple focus on xenophobia”, conceived as hatred along lines of 
identity derived from differences in citizenship status, is misleading because 
it fails to engage with the complex underlying social determinants.40 Rath-
er, in a situation where “poor people viciously attacked other poor people”, 
violence must be understood as rooted in intensifying class inequalities due 
to unequal economic growth that have produced “experiences of relative 
deprivation” and “perverse cultures of entitlement.”41 That is, the unmet 
mounting expectations of indigent South Africans made them strike out at 
those who were spatially and structurally closest to them. 
Another chapter – entitled “Behind Xenophobia in South Africa” – 
elaborates the relative deprivation argument, suggesting that the relation-
ship between violence and the economic circumstances of poor people 
is not that their poverty compelled them to viciously target others, but 
the “sense of unfairness engendered by inequality, of being discriminated 
against” produced fierce antipathy towards those seen, accurately or inac-
curately, to enjoy more than them.42 A study of the response of civil society 
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to the violence of May 2008 also argues that xenophobia is an epiphenom-
enon with underlying structural causes: “Within the processes of uneven 
and combined development of both capitalism and civil society…deep 
structural forces are responsible for xenophobia.”43 
Certainly, the incidence of violence in May 2008 was strongly correlated 
with the geography of poverty. But this simply begs the question of why 
not all poor areas (including many in which migrants and refugees resided) 
erupted or why poor South Africans were not attacking each other with 
similar ferocity. The economic insecurity of the offenders may account 
for their extreme anxiety and heightened dissatisfaction, but it does not 
explain why only certain groups were and are singled out for deadly assault. 
Furthermore, if economic competition between poor residents and migrants 
is the underlying cause of aggressive hostility, it does not explain why rich 
and privileged groups who do not face direct or even indirect competition 
from these migrants also espouse these prejudices especially when their 
lives are not touched negatively at all. 
By focusing on xenophobia as an “irrational fear of foreigners” (as many 
dictionary definitions characterize the phenomenon), some argue that 
blame has been unfairly laid on the indigent, desperate offenders, divert-
ing attention away from the government, state practices and other broader 
processes. One study, for example, contends that the failure to address 
the needs of the urban poor through real and continuous improvements 
to informal settlements, creates “vulnerable, precarious and dangerously 
combustible conditions” where “competition for very scarce and increas-
ingly downgraded resources will intensify”, compromising the lives of both 
“foreigners” and indigent South Africans.44 
When vicious attacks on migrants are conceived primarily as the out-
come of limited material realities and economic competition between citi-
zens and “foreigners”, then the frames of reference are automatically loaded 
against the latter. Seen in such terms, resentment and antipathy towards 
migrants and other “outsiders” become inevitable, inescapable aspects of 
the social landscape, justifying stringent controls over immigration, and 
exclusion (or at best very limited inclusion) of migrants. Needless to say, 
this distinction further invigorates the underlying rationale for xenophobia, 
the very idea that the presence of migrants and refugees poses a perpetual 
threat to the legitimate insiders. 
Similarly, the crisis of frustrated hopes and the crisis of governance that 
South Africa is currently undergoing, particularly at local levels, have lit-
tle if anything to do with the presence of migrants, which in itself suggests 
that these connections need to be constructed more carefully. Otherwise, 
we may end up reproducing the very prejudices that need to be confronted. 
One cannot deny that there is some degree of rivalry between locals and 
migrants and there may well be undesirable aspects attached to it. However, 
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migrants represent a very small minority in terms of numbers and as share 
of the total population in the country, leading us to believe that the detri-
mental effects of this economic competition have been seriously overstated. 
XenoPhobia realism 
National opinion surveys and in-depth qualitative interviews with groups of South Africans and migrants conducted over the best part of 
two decades lead to the inescapable conclusion that xenophobic attitudes 
are highly prevalent in South Africa amongst all social, economic, racial 
and class groups. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) 
has been monitoring the perceptions and attitudes of South Africans 
towards migrants and refugees since the late 1990s.45 These surveys provide 
unequivocal evidence of deep-rooted and pervasive hostility and animosity 
towards migrants and refugees in the country. Three general findings are 
of relevance to our argument: (a) the nature and strength of myths about 
migrant and migration; (b) the level of public endorsement of coercive state 
measures to keep migrants out of the country and to remove those who are 
present; and (c) the degree of willingness to resort to coercion and violence 
against migrants. 
First, with regard to migration myths, South Africans clearly believe that 
the country is being over-run by migrants and refugees who pose a very 
direct threat to their interests as citizens. The actual numbers in the coun-
try are a source of considerable controversy. There is a consistent tendency 
for politicians, officials and the media to exaggerate the numbers for alarm-
ist effect.46 Inflated figures for “illegal foreigners” are always in the millions 
and acquire a life of their own once they enter the public realm although 
they have no sound statistical basis.47 For example, the oft-repeated figure 
for the number of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa is 3 million while 
more considered estimates put the number at less than 1 million. For obvi-
ous reasons, the numbers of irregular migrants in the country are difficult to 
gauge. But given the ease with which people from neighbouring states can 
enter through regular channels, and the documented preference of migrants 
for temporary rather than permanent stay, these numbers are unlikely to be 
anywhere close to the inflated numbers of popular mythology. With regard 
to documented migration, the 2011 South African Census recorded 1.6 
million non-citizens in the country (or just 3.2% of the total population). In 
Gauteng (the industrial heartland of the country), the figure was 7.1% but 
in every other province at least 96% of the population were citizens (Table 
1). The figure for non-citizens includes many who immigrated during the 
heyday of white immigration from Europe during the apartheid era.48 In 
2011, South Africa issued a total of 106,173 temporary residence permits 
(of which 20,173 were for work purposes). Just 10,011 permanent residence 
permits were issued (2,060 for work).49
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Table 1: Number and Proportion of Citizens and Non-Citizens in South Africa, 2011









Western Cape 5,650,462 180,815 96.0 3.2 0.8
Eastern Cape 6,437,586 57,938 98.4 0.9 0.7
Northern Cape 1,125,306 10,128 98.8 0.9 0.3
Free State 2,663,080 50,599 97.8 1.9 0.3
KwaZulu-Natal 10,113,978 111,254 98.1 1.1 0.8
North West 3,439,700 120,390 95.9 3.5 0.6
Gauteng 11,952,392 848,620 91.9 7.1 1.0
Mpumalanga 3,983,570 103,573 96.8 2.6 0.6
Limpopo 5,322,134 138,375 96.9 2.6 0.5
Totals 50,688,208 1,621,692 96.1 3.2 0.7
Yet, 90% of South Africans recently interviewed by SAMP said that 
there are “too many” migrants in the country.50 Forty-four percent agreed 
with the statement that “many foreigners living in South Africa are illegal 
immigrants.” More than half of all respondents (63%) agreed that migrants 
diminish the resources available for citizens. Around 60% felt that migra-
tion leads to unemployment for citizens. One in two agreed that migrants 
contribute to growth in crime rates. Conversely, acceptance for the ben-
efits associated with migration was much lower. Only one-third of citizens 
acknowledged that migrants have a beneficial effect on skills shortages 
experienced by South Africa. 
Focus groups conducted by researchers immediately before the 2008 vio-
lence exposed elevated levels of anti-migrant antipathy, much sharper than 
in any other previous round of focus group interviews.51 Only one partici-
pant among the focus group members articulated anything positive about 
migrants living in South Africa. Respondents across race and class lines 
tied migrants to all sorts of social problems including unemployment, crime, 
housing shortages and poor service delivery. Humanitarian assistance pro-
vided by the South African government to those displaced by the violence 
was perceived as “preferential treatment” for migrants. They repeatedly 
asserted that South Africa was facing a migration crisis due to the “massive 
influx” of African migrants and endorsed strict immigration controls. 
Ironically, the language and imagery used by citizens to justify the exclu-
sion of outsiders is heavily influenced by the idioms of apartheid, such as 
the repetitive use of the term “influx control” by respondents.52 The media 
and officialdom frequently resort to aquatic metaphors and imagery when 
describing the “threat” posed to the country, as if migration was a kind 
of extreme natural event. “Foreigners” do not enter or cross borders into 
South Africa, they “flood” in “tidal waves” and “swamp” the country.53 
Figure 4 neatly satirises the common belief that Africa is a sea of poverty, 
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misery and chaos and that South Africa is a beacon of peace, stability and 
prosperity that is in imminent danger of being submerged by its neighbours. 
Figure 4: Africa as a Supposed Threat to South Africa
Cartoon reproduced by kind permission of Tony Grogan of the Cape Times. 
The SAMP survey showed that South Africans are strongly supportive 
of coercive state measures to stop the entry of migrants and refugees and 
to remove those already in the country, even suggesting that the state does 
not go far enough. Over a third (36%) agreed there should be a total pro-
hibition on migrants entering South Africa to work and as many as 63% 
agreed that there should be “strict limits on entry.” Only 8% agreed that 
government should let in anyone who wanted to enter. Three in five South 
Africans favoured the construction of electrified fences on the country’s 
borders, a policy that was last implemented during the apartheid era. A 
slightly higher share (63%) would like the armed forces to be responsible for 
border enforcement, linking migration unambiguously to issues of national 
security. More than half of all South Africans were dissatisfied with the cur-
rent immigration enforcement, and supported higher government budgets 
for it. Nearly half wanted all migrants to carry their identity documents 
with them at all times, another throwback to the pass laws of the apartheid 
regime when black South Africans were forced to carry similar documents 
or risk arrest and incarceration. 
The South African government’s policy of arrest and deportation of 
migrants is widely supported by citizens, despite doubt (even within gov-
ernment) of its efficacy. In fact, many South Africans want the use of this 
punitive measure to remove all sorts of migrants. For example, one in two 
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South Africans wanted to banish migrants who are not working. One in 
three citizens wanted migrants with HIV and AIDS to be expelled. And 
one in four wanted all migrants, irrespective of their standing in South 
Africa, to be deported. 
Table 2: South African Attitudes to Migrants and Refugees, 2010
Support (%) Oppose (%)
Attitudes to immigration enforcement
Army to patrol borders 63 10
Electrify fences on South Africa’s borders 62 18
Allocate more money for border protection 53 17
Foreigners to carry identity cards at all times 49 20
Penalize those employing foreigners 33 33
Attitudes to deportations
Deport migrants who have committed crimes 74 8
Deport migrants not contributing to economy 53 18
Deport migrants with HIV/AIDS 35 28
Deport all foreigners 24 47
Attitudes towards refugee protection
Test refugees for HIV/AIDS 41 29
Grant asylum to those escaping war/persecution 38 23
Put refugees in special camps near the border 31 32
Grant permanent residence after five years 18 44
Increase refugee intake in South Africa 11 57
South Africans also do not want refugees to rebuild their lives in South 
Africa. Support for mandatory HIV testing for refugees finds favour among 
over 40% of citizens. Close to one-third wanted refugees and asylum-
seekers to live in segregated camps near the border. Such a constrained 
approach to asylum poses a significant challenge for people who come to 
South Africa in search of safety. The reluctance to provide asylum to per-
sons in need and to support refugee protection is rooted in the belief that 
a large number of persons seeking asylum in South Africa are not genuine 
refugees. Regrettably, the opinion of South Africans is almost identical to 
that of the ruling ANC which has claimed, without substantive evidence 
and in an immigration policy document that does not contain a single refer-
ence to xenophobia, that 95% of refugee claimants are bogus.54 
South Africans do not feel that migrants in the country should be 
entitled to various basic rights including legal protection, police protec-
tion, access to social services and anti-retroviral therapy (ART) for HIV. 
As Table 3 shows, close to 90% felt that citizens are always entitled to 
these rights. However, only half thought that these same rights should be 
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extended to migrants legally in the country. And just a third believed that 
refugees should always enjoy legal and police protection and access to social 
services. Less than 20% said that irregular migrants should be entitled to 
these protections. The majority also thought that these migrants should 
not be entitled to HIV treatment. What these findings suggest is a great 
reluctance on the part of most South Africans to extend basic rights (guar-
anteed by the South African Constitution) to migrants. The particularly 
negative response to rights for refugees and irregular migrants reinforces an 
environment in which coercive state measures to deny rights and enforce 
migration controls (such as deportations) meet with little opposition from 
the populace. 










Right to legal protection 87 48 31 18
Protection by police 90 54 36 22
Access to social services 92 50 28 16
Treatment for AIDS 93 65 55 44
Another important finding concerns the apparent willingness of South 
Africans to turn belligerent attitudes into hostile actions. Moreover, the 
events of May 2008 appear to have had very little moderating influence. 
One in six South Africans (15%) were ready to collectively use force 
against migrants (Table 4). As many as 11% were willing to use violence 
against migrants. In 2011, 10% of the adult South African population (over 
the age of 15) would have amounted to around 3.6 million people. In effect, 
13 million South Africans are willing to report the presence of migrants to 
the authorities and over 3.5 million are willing to use violent means to force 
them out. One in four said they would use violence to prevent migrants 
from running a business in their locality. Nearly a quarter are ready to 
stop them from living in their neighborhoods and one in five do not want 
migrant children to interact with their own children. These South Africans 
not only want little to do with migrants in “their” residential areas and 
educational institutions, they are comfortable using violence to achieve 
and maintain this “social distance” from migrant groups. 
Given the considerable latent potential for the expression of extreme 
xenophobia amongst a sizable minority of South Africans, the key question 
is where, and under what conditions, this potential is likely to be realized. 
In-depth analyses of the xenophobic violence of May 2008 provide impor-
tant insights into this question, as well as challenging the stark determin-
istic links of the xenophobia minimalists.55 Fieldwork at the affected sites 
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has revealed that a great many of those who were assaulted were not new 
migrants, having lived in the area for many years. While their numbers 
had grown, the increase was not abrupt or excessive.56 Several studies 
have focused on the particular factors and “triggers” prevalent in the areas 
affected by violence. In all the locations where violence occurred in 2008, 
local groups and persons organized as well as guided the attacks in order 
to extend their own power and authority in these settlements.57 Violence 
occurred in areas that were already unstable and volatile with established 
pasts of forceful, organized conflict, such as taxi, gang and political vio-
lence, and where incidents of crime were much higher compared to other 
locations. 
Table 4: Likelihood of Taking Action Against Foreign Migrants
Willingness to: %
Report them to police 36
Report them to employer 27
Report them to community organization 27
Stop them running a business in their area 25
Stop them from moving into the neighbourhood 23
Prevent their children from being in the same classroom 20
Get people together to force them to leave 15
Use violence against them 11
These localized conditions have been characterized as the “micro- 
politics of violence.”58 The common element is the struggle for local lead-
ership, which permitted the appearance of illegitimate, violent forms of 
politics and community organizing by manipulating local residents’ hostility 
toward “non-compliant”, undesirable outsiders. The second element is the 
absence of effective conflict resolution mechanisms and in their absence, 
the use of vigilantism and mob violence to resolve conflicts and other social 
matters involving migrants. A third factor is the “culture of impunity” 
existing in South Africa and its tolerance for public violence and especially 
xenophobic violence, which in turn encourages residents to target migrants 
repeatedly for individual and political gain. The influence of local condi-
tions and “triggers” is therefore decisive in shaping extreme xenophobia. 
Since cycles of xenophobic violence may appear to end as abruptly as 
they appear, the follow-up question is when, and under what conditions, 
expressions of extreme xenophobia terminate. The report on May 2008 
of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) found that 
although local leaders were able to intervene successfully in some contexts, 
in many others, the violence ended only after the “source of conflict” – the 
migrants – had been completely removed and their properties confiscated, 
and not because peace had returned to these communities.59 Termination 
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is really only possible when strong restraints are imposed on the actual and 
potential perpetrators through sustained intervention of law enforcement 
agencies or the army. In other words, violence may not necessarily subside 
even after the offenders have purged “their” spaces. This certainly helps 
explain why the intense violence of May 2008 subsided but continued 
sporadic violence has continued. For example, the culture of impunity that 
existed prior to May 2008 has been reinforced by the poor prosecution of 
perpetrators and failure to impose harsh sanctions on their behaviour.60 
Such an environment of general permissiveness can only encourage more 
aggression given the high potential for violent action. 
The South African government’s reaction to the purge in mid-2008 and 
its “management” of the large-scale humanitarian crisis has been character-
ized as deeply discriminatory.61 Despite being exposed to shocking aggres-
sion and displacement, the terms and quality of protection was determined 
by the victims’ status as “foreigners” and what was seen to be their tem-
porary residence in South Africa. In many areas, state authorities encour-
aged those affected to leave the country, facilitating their hasty departure 
or “voluntary deportation”, and undermining the eventual prosecution of 
offenders. Agencies such as police were similarly disinclined to negotiate on 
behalf of the victims for fear of alienating local residents and in some cases, 
actively aided the offenders or like them, looted the victims’ properties. 
 Although the number of individuals who participated in the violence of 
May 2008 may have been relatively limited, the social legitimacy of these 
actions was widespread.62 Nearly 60% of the South Africans surveyed by 
SAMP were unconcerned about the violence: 28% said they felt no guilt 
for the attacks and another 28% were indifferent. Only a third felt any 
personal responsibility to help repair the damage done to migrants. A much 
smaller proportion felt that the migrants deserved what happened to them 
(14%) and that the attacks were justified (15%). However, 35% and 42% 
respectively were indifferent (Table 5).63 Among the most common reasons 
given for the violence were that migrants were involved in crime (cited 
by 64%), they take jobs from South Africans (62%), are “culturally differ-
ent” (60%), “cheat” South Africans and do not belong (both 56%), use 
South African health services for free (55%), and take housing away from 
South Africans (52%) (Table 6). In other words, when South Africans try 
to explain why the extreme violence of May 2008 occurred, they draw on 
the reservoir of myths and stereotypes of migrants as job-stealers, cheats, 
thieves and culturally-different. A third agreed with the official denialist 
position that South African criminals perpetrated the violence. 
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I feel guilty about what South Africans did to foreign migrants 44 28 28
I believe I should help repair the damage to foreign migrants 33 28 37
I think foreign migrants deserve what happened to them 14 53 33
I oppose the violence against foreign migrants 11 54 35
The violence against foreign migrants was justified 15 43 42
Table 6: South African Explanations for the Xenophobic Attacks on Migrants in May 2008
Reasons for the attacks: % agree % disagree
They cause crime in South Africa 64 11
They take jobs from South Africans 62 16
They are culturally different 60 14
They cheat South Africans 56 14
They do not belong in South Africa 56 17
They use health services for free 55 15
They take RDP houses from South Africans 52 17
The men ‘steal’ South African women 52 19
South African criminals are to blame 32 27
The police do not protect them 27 37
ConClusion
The anti-migrant violence that plagues contemporary South Africa has prompted considerable commentary and analysis. Initially bewildered 
by the unexpectedness and ferocity of the 2008 violence, the South African 
government settled on a position that the deaths, destruction and displace-
ment were the work of criminal elements in the affected areas. Certainly, 
the actions of the perpetrators were crimes under South Africa law, but that 
is not the same thing as saying that the rationale for these, and subsequent, 
attacks was criminality rather than xenophobia. Ex-President Mbeki’s posi-
tion has remained the official stance of the South African government 
towards May 2008 and the six years of xenophobic violence that have 
followed. In this paper we designate the official position as xenophobia 
denialism. Disowning the existence of xenophobia not only flies in the 
face of a large body of quantitative and qualitative research, it illustrates a 
continuing lack of political will (first evident in the mid-1990s) to own the 
problem and act against one of the most destructive and anti-democratic 
forces in post-apartheid South Africa.
The majority of academic commentary on the violence has also eschewed 
xenophobia as an explanation, seeing it instead as an epiphenomenon or 
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symptom of a deeper malaise. These scholars seek a materialist explana-
tion for the violence, generally viewing it as the outworking of structural 
economic inequalities and the capture of the ANC by neo-liberalism with 
the consequent inability of the state to effect a fundamental transformation 
and redistribution of wealth and resources in the country. For the xeno-
phobia minimalists, grinding poverty, inequality and fierce competition for 
resources in the country’s impoverished informal settlements will inevitably 
lead to victimization of the most vulnerable. 
This paper takes the position that both xenophobia denialism and xeno-
phobia minimalism ignore the evidence that the majority of South Africans 
hold extremely negative views about migrants and refugees and want the 
state to exercise greater coercive power to purge the country of their pres-
ence. These views are suffused with a powerful set of migration myths about 
migrants and their supposed threat to the interests of citizens. We argue 
that xenophobia realism is the only way to make sense of the phenomenon 
of extreme xenophobia (that is, the translation of hostile attitudes into 
violent actions). The primary challenge for xenophobia realists is to explain 
why, if hostility is so widespread, violence tends to be more confined, tar-
geted at poorer neighbourhoods in the cities. First, whether and where 
animosity translates into actions depends on community-specific dynamics 
such as the nature of local leadership, the absence of dispute resolution 
mechanisms and the character of policing. Second, all of the common 
myths about migrants are offered by residents to explain why the attacks 
take place. Migration myths are not epiphenomena or post-hoc rationaliza-
tions; they have powerful mobilizing and animating effects spurring those 
who believe them into acts of extreme xenophobia. 
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aPPenDiX: 
XenoPhobiC attaCks on miGrant entrePreneurs: timeline
1996
 6RPDOL UHIXJHHV DUH WKUHDWHQHG DQG DWWDFNHG E\ ORFDO WUDGHUV LQ *HUPLVWRQ DQG
forced to stop trading in Kempton Park. One migrant is fatally shot. Migrants say 
police told them to “go back to your own country”.
1997
 /RFDO KDZNHUV RUJDQL]H [HQRSKRELF FDPSDLJQ DJDLQVWPLJUDQW WUDGHUV LQ FHQWUDO
Johannesburg, looting their goods and attacking them. Chairperson of Inner 
Johannesburg Hawkers Committee reportedly states: “We are prepared to push 
them out of the city, come what may. My group is not prepared to let our govern-
ment inherit a garbage city because of these leeches.”
 6RPH6RXWK$IULFDQKDZNHUVRUJDQL]HDPDUFKLQ-RKDQQHVEXUJFKDQWLQJVOR-








for malicious damage to property and theft.
 'XULQJFRPPXQLW\SURWHVWLQ%RWKDYLOOH)UHH6WDWHDJDLQVWWKHORFDOPXQLFLSDOLW\




township outside Knysna, Somali-run stores are looted and destroyed. Some thirty 
stores are ransacked and their owners are chased out of the area.
 ,QDPRQWKRIDWWDFNVDJDLQVW6RPDOLUHIXJHHVLQWKH&DSH)ODWVDURXQGWKLUW\SHU-
sons are killed and their shops robbed and looted.
 6RPDOLUXQVWRUHVDUHUHSHDWHGO\WRUFKHGLQ'LHSVORRWRXWVLGH-RKDQQHVEXUJ
 0RUHWKDQWZHQW\WXFNVKRSVDQGIUXLWVWDOOVRZQHGE\0R]DPELFDQPLJUDQWVDUH
vandalized and ten migrants are injured after stones are hurled at them.
 6RPDOLUXQVKRSVDUHDWWDFNHGLQ0DVLSKXPHOHOH&DSH7RZQDQGWKHLUFRQWHQWV
are ransacked and torched. Dozens of migrants flee the area.
2007
 81+&5 H[SUHVVHV FRQFHUQ RYHU WKH LQFUHDVLQJ IUHTXHQF\ RI DWWDFNV RQ 6RPDOL
migrants. The Somali community claims some 400 migrants have been killed during 
past decade.
 $QWL6RPDOL ULRWV EUHDN RXW LQ 3RUW (OL]DEHWK DQG LW LV UHSRUWHG WKDW VRPH 
Somalis have been killed over a six-month period in the Western Cape.
 2YHURQHKXQGUHG6RPDOLUXQVWRUHVDUHDWWDFNHGDQGORRWHGLQ0RWKHUZHOO6RPH
four hundred migrants flee the area in fear, leaving behind their belongings. 
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 $ ODUJH PRE SLOODJHV DQG GDPDJHV VWRUHV EHORQJLQJ WR %DQJODGHVKL 3DNLVWDQL
Somali and Ethiopian shopkeepers in Ipelegeng near Schwiezer-Reneke.
 6KRSVRZQHGE\6RPDOLVDQGRWKHUPLJUDQWJURXSVDUHWRUFKHGGXULQJDQWLJRYHUQ-
ment protests in Khutsong near Johannesburg.
 0LJUDQWUXQVKRSVDUHYLROHQWO\DWWDFNHGDQGORRWHGLQ'HOPDVFDXVLQJVRPHIRUW\
migrants to flee and seek shelter elsewhere.
 7ZR6RPDOLPLJUDQWVDUHNLOOHGLQ0RVVHO%D\DIWHUWKHLUVKRSLVWRUFKHG
2008
 /RFDO UHVLGHQWV DWWDFN 6RPDOLUXQ VKRSV LQ -HIIUH\·V %D\ IRUFLQJ PDQ\ 6RPDOL
migrants to seek refuge at a local police station.
 $IWHUIRXUPLJUDQWVDUHDSSUHKHQGHGIRUEUHDNLQJLQWRDORFDOVWRUHLQ6RVKDQJXYH
the stores and homes of migrants are looted and torched. Many migrants flee the 
area.
 ,WLUHOHQJUHVLGHQWVDUHHQFRXUDJHGWRFKDVHRXWPLJUDQWVGXULQJDFRPPXQLW\PHHW-
ing. Violent clashes soon follow and migrant stores and homes are looted and burnt.
 9DOKDOOD3DUNUHVLGHQWVIRUFHIXOO\HYLFWILYH6RPDOLVKRSNHHSHUV
 $URXQG PLJUDQWVWRUHV DQG KRPHV DUH YDQGDOL]HG GDPDJHG DQG WRUFKHG LQ
Atteridgeville forcing some 500 migrants to seek shelter elsewhere. More than 




by large mobs and their shops and homes are destroyed. Somali-owned shops are 
looted in Kynsna.
 2QH VRXUFH UHSRUWV WKDWGXULQJ WKH[HQRSKRELFYLROHQFH WKDW VZHSW WKHFRXQWU\




 6RPDOL VKRSRZQHU0DKDG$EXNDU$ODVRZ LV VKRW GHDGE\ JURXSRIPHQZKLOH
returning to Khayelitsha from the Soetwater safety camp. Somalis express their 
shock at death: “We know how the people hate us in this country.” They claim he 
is the eighth Somali migrant to have been killed after returning from the camp. 
Twenty more are injured in attacks.
 +XQGUHGVRI6RPDOLVKRSNHHSHUVLQ.KD\HOLWVKDVD\WKDWWKH\KDYHUHFHLYHGWKUHDW-
ening hand-delivered letters from local Zanokhanyo Retailers’ Association asking 
them to close their businesses by mid-September. Abdulrahim Mohammed, who 
own two shops says: “We fear for our lives. This is just like Somalia, only worse.” 
Chairperson of Cape Flats Somali community Kakaroos says that he is shocked to 
“receive such threats from people who are supposed to be my brothers in business. 
What they don’t understand is that we employ locals, we create jobs.”
 6RPDOL VKRS DVVLVWDQW LV VKRW GHDG LQ 'HOIW D GD\ DIWHU =DQRNKDQ\R 5HWDLOHUV·




refugees and setting twenty shops on fire. 
 6RPDOL VKRSNHHSHUV LQ 0LWFKHOOV 3ODLQ 7RZQ &HQWUH UHFHLYH DQRQ\PRXV OHWWHUV
demanding they close their shops or face violent reprisals.
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 $IWHUDFKLOGLVPXUGHUHGLQ0DVLSKXPHOHOHORFDOUHVLGHQWVFODVKZLWKLPPLJUDQWV
believing that an immigrant was responsible for Ayola Adonis’ death. Twelve shops 
are looted and damaged. Migrants are forced out of their homes. Police later con-
firm that the suspect is a South African. 
2009
 6KRSVRZQHGE\PLJUDQWVDUHORRWHGLQ:RUFHVWHU
 ,Q WZR VHSDUDWH LQFLGHQWV LQ'HOIW SHRSOH RSHQHG ILUH RQ %DQJODGHVKLPLJUDQWV
killing Shabier Ahmed and injuring Abdur Rahman and Mohammed Hussein. 
Another Bangladeshi migrant, Anwar Mohammed, and owner of a shop where 




store is set alight in Darling.
 *XJXOHWKXWUDGHUVVHQWWKUHDWHQLQJOHWWHUVWR6RPDOLVKRSRZQHUVLQWKHDUHDDGYLV-
ing them to leave within seven days. Seven shops owned by Somali refugees are 
closed down.
 (OHYHQ PLJUDQW VKRSNHHSHUV IURP =ZHOHWKHPED 7RZQVKLS LQ :RUFHVWHU DSSHDU
before Equality Court to seek financial compensation and apology from police for 
failing to protect them during the March 2009 attacks.
 $IWHU D VHULHV RI PHHWLQJV EHWZHHQ 6RPDOL DQG 6RXWK $IULFDQ VKRSNHHSHUV LQ
Gugulethu, Somali migrants are forced to increase the price of goods to correspond 





and pelt stones to compel them to increase their food prices. Four shops are dam-
aged in Langrug and Mooiwater informal settlements and one migrant is injured.
 &DSH7RZQ0D\RU'DQ3ODWRVD\VWKDWFLW\LVRQKLJKDOHUWDIWHU6RPDOLWUDGHUVLQ
Samora Machel and Gugulethu receive threatening letters.
 'XULQJPHGLDWLRQHIIRUWVZLWKORFDODQGPLJUDQWWUDGHUVLQ*XJXOHWKX6RPDOLVKRS
owners are asked to move their shops 100 meters away from their local competitors 
and inform the Somali Association of South Africa in the Western Cape before 
opening a shop. 
 6KRSV RZQHG E\ (WKLRSLDQ DQG 3DNLVWDQL LPPLJUDQWV DUH ORRWHG LQ %DOIRXU DQG
burned during protests against poor government service delivery. 30 migrants seek 




store looted. Somali migrants allege that local South African traders are instigating 
these attacks in bid to force them to close their businesses. 
2010
 $IWHUWKHERG\RIDORFDOPDQLVGLVFRYHUHGLQ5LYLHULVRQGHUHQGVRPHUHVLGHQWV
attack and loot shops owned by Somali migrants. Twenty migrants flee to the local 
police station for protection and, a day later, leave the area permanently.
 6HYHQWHHQ\HDUROG6RPDOLVKRSNHHSHU6PLOH+DMLGLHVDQGDQRWKHU6RPDOL6DODG
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Apdi is injured when petrol bomb is hurled at their store in Crossroads. Local 
police say that they will not be increasing patrols at Somali-owned shops. Somali 
Association of South Africa Western Cape Chairperson Hussein Omar observes: 
“We are concerned. Since the xenophobic attacks [in May 2008], it has been get-
ting worse. We think this is a very organized plan to threaten Somalis. And the 
police do nothing about it. There are never any follow-ups to investigations.”
 6RPDOLVIRUFHGRXWRI5LYLHUVRQGHUHQGDIWHUWKHLUVKRSVZHUHGHVWUR\HGFRQWLQXHWR
live in a municipal shed. 
 'XULQJ VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\ SURWHVWV LQ 6L\DWKHPED 7RZQVKLS VHYHUDO KXQGUHG ORFDO
residents loot and burn shops owned by migrants, forcing them to flee for a second 
time in eight months. Some 134 Ethiopian migrants are displaced and seek shelter 
in safer areas locally or in other provinces. 
 'HQRXQFLQJORFDODQGSURYLQFLDOSROLFHIDLOXUHWRSURWHFWSURSHUW\DQGHQVXUHVDIHW\
of immigrants in Siyathemba Township, Amnesty International declares immigrants 
are being attacked “with impunity” in South Africa.
 'XULQJ VHUYLFHGHOLYHU\ SURWHVW LQ2UDQJH)DUP ORFDO UHVLGHQWV ORRWPLJUDQWUXQ
shops.
 'XULQJ GHPRQVWUDWLRQV LQ 5HLJHU 3DUN $WWHULGJHYLOOH (QQHUGDOH 'REVRQYLOOH
Daveyton, Sharpeville and Orange Farm, migrant-owned stores are looted and 
destroyed.
 6KRSVRZQHGE\PLJUDQWVDUHORRWHGLQ:RUFHVWHU
 /HWWHUV DUH VHQW WR 6RPDOL WUDGHUV LQ0RUUHHVEXUJ RXWVLGH &DSH 7RZQ GLUHFWLQJ
them to close down their stores. A crowd of some fifty persons later attacks trad-
ers and ransacks their stores. Four Somali refugees are hurt. Somali human rights 
activist Abdhihakim Mohammed asserts that his fellow migrants are regular targets 
of xenophobic violence and that despite “ongoing efforts” of authorities, “they are 






 0HPEHUVRI WKH6RXWK0XQLFLSDO:RUNHUV·8QLRQ 6$0:8RUJDQL]HDSURWHVW
against Pakistani traders in Mhluzu and demand that they exit the area. Later, 
union members and local residents vandalize and raid stores. Two shops are com-
pletely destroyed by fire. 
 6RPDOL WUDGHUV LQ &DSH 7RZQ UHYHDO WKDW WKH\ GR QRW IHHO VDIH WUDGLQJ LQ FLW\·V
numerous townships because they regularly receive threats and are victims of 
xenophobic violence. Somali Community Board of South Africa maintains that 17 
immigrants have died in xenophobic attacks so far in 2010.
 'XULQJSURWHVWDJDLQVWSRRUVFKRROFRQGLWLRQVLQ0DOPHVEXU\VWXGHQWVDVVDXOWVHY-
eral Somali traders, raiding their stores and destroying their property. 
 /RFDOUHVLGHQWVDWWDFNVKRSRZQHGE\DQ(WKLRSLDQPLJUDQWLQ:ROVOH\7ZRSHUVRQV
including an Ethiopian migrant, receive injuries. 
 $IWHUDQDOWHUFDWLRQLQYROYLQJD6RXWK$IULFDQDQGD6RPDOLPLJUDQWQHDU6DVROEXUJ
more than eleven shops are looted. 
 6RPDOL VKRSNHHSHU0DKRPHG$KPHG LV LQMXUHG LQ&DSH7RZQZKHQ WKUHHPHQ
attack him in his store and decamp with his money.
 7ZR6RXWK$IULFDQVKRSRZQHUVDW%ORHNRPERVRXWVLGH&DSH7RZQDUHGHWDLQHGIRU
trying to incite violence against Somali traders. 
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 $IWHUUHFHLYLQJWKUHDWVIURPFXVWRPHUVLQ7HPELVD7RZQVKLSWKDWPLJUDQWVVKRXOG
leave South Africa after the World Cup, traders begin to temporarily close shops. 
 6RPH0DNKD]DUHVLGHQWVLQWHUYHQHWRSUHYHQWYLROHQFHZKHQSHUVRQVDWWDFN6RPDOL
spaza shops after the South African team is ousted from World Cup tournament. 
 6RPDOL5HWDLOHUV·$VVRFLDWLRQFRQILUPVWKDWD6RPDOLVKRSNHHSHUKDVEHHQNLOOHGLQ




migrants begin to leave city. It is reported that Somali traders in Cape Town are not 
restocking or keeping their stocks at low levels to avoid looting. 
 ,WLVUHSRUWHGWKDWORFDO6RXWK$IULFDQEXVLQHVVPHQKDYHKLUHGFULPLQDOVWRGHOLEHU-
ately target migrant-owned businesses.
 9LROHQW LQFLGHQWV DUH UHSRUWHG LQ 6LOYHUWRQ 3KLOOLSL /DQJD &DSH 7RZQ DQG
Mbekweni, involving looting of migrant-owned shops. 
 6RPHSHUVRQVORRWD6RPDOLRZQHGVKRSLQ.KD\HOLWVKDDVKRUWGLVWDQFHDZD\
from where National Police Commissioner gives anti-xenophobia speech. Several 
Somali shopkeepers close their stores and leave with their belongings. Migrants say: 
“these people called us makwerekwere and said we must go home. They said no 
one from another land is going to stay here.” Community leader Michael Hamco 
denounces the attackers as “just criminals who roam the street and have nothing 
to do.” 
 6HYHQW\LPPLJUDQWVVHHNUHIXJHDW0EHNZHQLSROLFHVWDWLRQDIWHUORRWLQJDQGEXUQ-
ing of shops. Somali-owned shops are also scorched in Philippi. Smaller numbers 
of migrants seek the safety of police stations in Franschhoek, Langa, and Harare. 
Provincial authorities say there have been “sporadic” attacks on shops and “some 
incidents of looting” in areas like Mbekweni, Paarl East, Wellington, and Nyanga. 
 1\DQJDSROLFHDGYLVHLPPLJUDQWVHVSHFLDOO\6RPDOLVWROHDYHWKHDUHDDQGHVFRUW
them to safety elsewhere. 
 )UDQVFKKRHNSROLFHVD\WKDWDOOPLJUDQWRZQHGVWRUHVLQWZRLQIRUPDOVHWWOHPHQWV
are closed.
 7ZR (WKLRSLDQPLJUDQWV DUH VKRW WR GHDWK LQ WKHLU VSD]D VKRSV LQ:DOPHU 3RUW
Elizabeth. Although the assailants leave without taking anything from store, the 
police deny the murders were motivated by xenophobia.
 6RPDOL WUDGHU ,EUDKLP $OL LV VKRW DQG NLOOHG LQ KLV VWRUH LQ .XJ\D ,QIRUPDO
Settlement, Port Elizabeth.
 5HVLGHQWVRI:DOODFHGHQHLQIRUPDOVHWWOHPHQWLQ&DSH7RZQKXUODSHWUROERPEDW
a Somali-owned store, injuring three migrants. In a separate incident, armed assail-
ants shoot another Somali migrant in the shoulder and leg.
 $6RPDOLHQWUHSUHQHXULVVKRWLQKLVVKRSDQGUHFHLYHVLQMXULHVDW=LQ\RND7RZQVKLS
near Motherwell.
 6RPDOL VKRSNHHSHUV VXJJHVW WKDW LPPLJUDQW DQWLSDWK\ UHPDLQV DW KLJK OHYHOV LQ
Cape Town: “Xenophobia is part of life. We do not live easy here. We only survive” 
says one.
 7KUHHPLJUDQWEXVLQHVVRZQHUVWZRIURP6RPDOLDDQGDQRWKHUIURP(WKLRSLDDUH
shot to death in Cape Town, while three other migrants are injured. The Somali 
community says 30 traders have been victims of targeted attacks since August.
 6RPDOLWUDGHU&\UL[0DQLVVKRWWZLFHLQWKHKHDGRXWVLGHKLVVKRSLQ.KD\HOLWVKD
and dies from injuries. Other Somali migrants living locally say they are living in 
fear and wondering who’s going to be next: “We came to South Africa to survive 
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not die” says one. The Khayelitsha Somali Retailers’ Association states that more 
than 22 Somali migrants have been killed locally over past three months. 
 /RFDOEXVLQHVVRZQHUVIRUFHPLJUDQWRZQHGVKRSVWRFORVHLQ)UHHGRP3DUNLQIRU-
mal settlement near Johannesburg. Three South Africans and one migrant are 
killed and migrant-owned businesses are raided.
2011
 $ 6RPDOL WUDGHU EXUQV WR GHDWK DIWHU KLV VKRS LV DWWDFNHG E\ DQ DUPHG JDQJ LQ
Samora Machel Township, Western Cape
 *DXWHQJ0(&IRUORFDOJRYHUQPHQWDQGKRXVLQJHVWDEOLVKHVDWDVNWHDPWRH[DPLQH
tensions between locals and migrants in Freedom Park. Shops belonging to migrants 
are to remain closed during the investigation. Local ward Councilor Ntombela says 
only 12 migrant-owned stores are to be allowed to remain locally.
 $IWHU UHQHZHG WKUHDWV RI YLROHQFH DJDLQVW 6RPDOL WUDGHUV LQ 5DPDSKRVD SROLFH
patrol the area. 
 6RPDOLVKRSRZQHU,GLULV+DMLLVNLOOHGLQ'HOIWDIWHUKHLVVKRWDQGDSHWUROERPELV
thrown at his store, which is extensively damaged.
 'XULQJVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\SURWHVWVWKRXVDQGVRISHRSOHUDLGVKRSVEHORQJLQJWR6RPDOL
traders in Ermelo and Lephalale, taking or destroying their goods. Migrants say only 
shops belonging to non-South Africans are looted and police refuse to help them, 
telling them to return to their country of origin.
 6RPDOLRZQHG EXVLQHVVHV LQ )UHHGRP 3DUN VHWWOHPHQW RSHQ DIWHU WKUHH PRQWKV





owned shops on behalf of the Gauteng Business Forum.
 $IWHUDPLJUDQWLVDFFXVHGRIUDSLQJD\HDUROGJLUOLQ/HERZDNJRPRORFDOUHVL-
dents attack Ethiopian immigrants and damage their homes, shops and vehicles. 
Four migrants are injured and some 150 Ethiopian migrants flee the area.
 *UHDWHU*DXWHQJ%XVLQHVV)RUXPPHPEHUVDUHDUUHVWHG LQ6RZHWRDIWHUDSURWHVW
march demanding Somali and Pakistani traders close their stores. 
 'HSXW\ 0LQLVWHU RI 7UDGH DQG ,QGXVWU\ 7KDEHWKH WHOOV VPDOO EXVLQHVV RZQHUV
in Tshiawelo, Soweto to stop complaining about foreign traders: “you guys give 
these foreigners places to stay and places to do business because you love money.” 
Gauteng Business Forum Chairperson Mokhosana Mhlanga criticizes Minister’s the 
remarks: “these people [migrants] are molesting our economy.”
 )RXUWHHQVKRSVRZQHGE\6RPDOLWUDGHUVDUHUDLGHGLQ0RWKHUZHOODQGVHWRQILUH
Two stores are completely destroyed in Kamvelihle and Ramaphosa. Other Somali 
traders abandon the area. 
 PHPEHUVRIWKH*UHDWHU*DXWHQJ%XVLQHVV)RUXPDUHDUUHVWHGLQ(OGRUDGR3DUN
and nine charged for organizing an illegal gathering after Forum organizes campaign 
to shut selected migrant-owned businesses. 
 )RXU6RPDOLRZQHGVWRUHVDUHVHWRQILUHLQ3RUW(OL]DEHWKDQGPRUHWKDQILIW\RWK-
ers are raided in Motherwell and KwaDwesi. Some 200 Somali migrants flee fearing 
for their safety. Police rule out xenophobia as cause of violence and attribute it to 
business rivalry between local and migrant traders. 
 6RPH6RPDOLWUDGHUVVHHNVKHOWHUDW0RWKHUZHOO3ROLFH6WDWLRQZLWKWKHLUJRRGV
after their stores are set alight by residents. 
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 :KLOH WU\LQJ WR IRUFLEO\ RXVW 6RPDOL WUDGHUV IURP 5DPDSKRVD *UHDWHU *DXWHQJ
Business Forum members are confronted by local women who urge them to leave 
the migrants alone. The Forum organizes a march in defiance of court order and 
some members are arrested.
 7KH1,$LVDSSDUHQWO\ORRNLQJLQWRFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQYDULRXV´EXVLQHVVIRUXPVµ
in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng and their role in inciting violence against migrant 
businesses.
 *UHDWHU*DXWHQJ%XVLQHVV)RUXPUHYHDOVWKDWWKH\KDYHEHHQDVNHGWRVHWXSVLPLODU







attached and robbed. 
 JDQJPHPEHUVDWWDFND6RPDOLWUDGHU·VVKRSLQ.KD\HOLWVKD2QHPDQLVVWDEEHG
 7ZR6RPDOLPLJUDQWVGLHDIWHUXQLGHQWLILHGSHUVRQVVKRRWWKHPLQWKHIDFHLQ'HOIW
 $ %DQJODGHVKL VKRSNHHSHU LV UREEHG RI KLV SRVVHVVLRQV LQ 3RORNZDQH LQFOXGLQJ





gees living in South Africa, a prominent Somali cleric and businessman is shot and 
killed in Duncan Village. 
 7KH6RPDOL5HIXJHH)RUXPVWDWHV WKDW VRPH WXFN VKRSVEHORQJLQJ WR6RPDOL
Ethiopian and other migrant communities have been closed since June in Steve 
Tshwete Municipality because municipality will not issue them licenses. The 
Municipality denies discrimination and insists that only landowners can apply for 
such licenses. The Middleburg Small Business Community Forum, representing 
South African traders, says it helped to mobilize local government for the closures. 
The Forum says they “are a non-violent organization”, while highlighting “prob-
lems” associated with migrants: “Why should townships become dumping sites 
where foreign people come to promote lawlessness?”
 /RFDO UHVLGHQWVKROGYLROHQWSURWHVWV LQ$WWHULGJHYLOOHRXWVLGH3UHWRULDDWWDFNLQJ
and raiding Somali-owned stores. The trouble begins when a Somali shop owner is 
pelted with stones. He fires shots at the crowd killing a woman.
 5HVSRQGLQJ WR UHFHQW YLROHQFH LQ $WWHULGJHYLOOH (FRQRPLF 'HYHORSPHQW 0(&
urges people not to attack migrant traders and says: “Violent acts are an embarrass-
ment to the country.” He says that perpetrators would be severely punished.
 $JURXSFDOOLQJLWVHOI$OH[DQGUD%RQDILGHVVHQGVQRWLFHVGHPDQGLQJWKDWPLJUDQWV
leave RDP homes in Alexandra Township otherwise they will be “pushed like ani-
mals or aliens.” Police say that they are closely monitoring the situation after reports 
of death threats against migrants are received. 
 &ULPLQDOFKDUJHVDUHILOHGDJDLQVW'XPD.XODVKHOHDGHURIWKH$OH[DQGUD%RQDILGHV
group for threatening to attack migrants.
 6RPH  UHVLGHQWV RI (NXUKXOHQL PDUFK WR WKH *DXWHQJ 3UHPLHU·V RIILFH DQG
hand over memorandum urging strict action against migrant-owned businesses. 
Organized by the Ekurhuleni Concerned Residents, Business and Enterprise Forum, 
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participants accuse migrant traders of evading municipal by-laws and of selling 
drugs. A Forum spokesperson says they do not want to take the law into their own 
hands, but adds: “what do you expect people to do if they are going hungry because 
foreigners are running down their businesses.” He says they are seeking “positive 
response within 14 days, failing which we will take drastic steps.” Migrant busi-
nesses remain closed during the protests. 
 7ZR%DQJODGHVKLPHQDUHUREEHGDQGVWDEEHGWRGHDWKLQDVKRSLQ7KDERQJ
 ,QFDVHDJDLQVWWKH6DIHW\DQG6HFXULW\0LQLVWU\-XGJH1DWKDQ(UDVPXVUXOHVWKDW
police “failed” to protect migrant shopkeepers in Zwelethemba who were assaulted 
in March 2008 and had their shops looted. He adds that traders failed to prove 
police discriminated against them. 
2012
 7ZR%DQJODGHVKLVDUHNLOOHGDIWHUDSHWUROERPELVKXUOHGDWWKHLUVKRSLQ7KRNR]D
township. They are attacked after local residents insist migrant traders must leave 
the area. 
 0RUHWKDQVKRSVRZQHGE\%DQJODGHVKLDQG3DNLVWDQLPLJUDQWVDUHDWWDFNHG
and looted in Thabong, Welkom and Odendaalsrus for three days. Some migrants 
are also attacked and injured. This happens after local youth take to the streets 
when discussions with mines stall over preferential employment for South Africans.
 0HPEHUVRI=DQRNKDQ\R%XVLQHVV$VVRFLDWLRQ IRUFHPRUH WKDQ ILYH6RPDOL WUDG-
ers to close their shops permanently in Khayelitsha. Two Somali-owned shops are 
looted and several shops destroyed. 
 6RPH  \RXWKV UHWXUQLQJ IURP D IXQHUDO UDQVDFN D JURFHU\ VWRUH EHORQJLQJ WR
three Bangladeshi migrants in Soweto. 
 $ODUJHJURXSORRWVPLJUDQWUXQVWRUHVLQ)RXULHVEXUJ
 $1&·V´SHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\µSROLF\GLVFXVVLRQUHSRUWUHFRPPHQGVIRUHLJQQDWLRQDOV
with spaza shops be subjected to stricter by-laws compared to their South African 
counterparts. 
 $QJU\ UHVLGHQWV RI 5DWDQGD LQIRUPDO VHWWOHPHQW UDQVDFN VWRUHV EHORQJLQJ WR
migrants during a service delivery protest.
 6KDUSHYLOOH UHVLGHQWVKROG DSURWHVWPDUFKDIWHU+XPDQ5LJKWV'D\ FHOHEUDWLRQV
are moved elsewhere, during which spaza shops belonging to foreign nationals are 
ransacked, while migrants flee for safety.
 6RPDOLPLJUDQW6DODDW+XVVHLQLVNLOOHGDWKLVVWRUHGXULQJDUREEHU\LQ.XLOV5LYHU
Cape Town. Somalians say they are being targeted in townships because of business 
rivalry and xenophobic violence incited by community leaders and local traders. 
 5HVLGHQWVDWWDFNDQGUDQVDFNVWRUHVEHORQJLQJWR3DNLVWDQLLPPLJUDQWVLQ0RGLPROOH
Township, Limpopo. The attacks happen two days after two Pakistanis are impli-
cated in death of local woman. Many Pakistani traders seek refuge in neighbouring 
townships. Some news reports say other migrants’ shops (Somalis and Ethiopians) 
have also been looted and vandalized. 
 )LIW\PHPEHUV RI =DQRNKDQ\R5HWDLOHUV·$VVRFLDWLRQ WKUHDWHQ WR EXUQGRZQ DQG
demolish Somali-owned stores in Khayelitsha. Police watch as members go from 
store to store and forcibly close fifteen shops. However, residents of Town Two 
protest and say they do not support the Association’s actions. 
 'XULQJVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\SURWHVWVLQ(NXUKXOHQLUHVLGHQWVDWWDFNPXQLFLSDOSURSHUW\
and shops belonging to migrants.
 6RPDOLWUDGHUVLQ0DVLSKXPHOHOHVD\WKH\DUHWHUULILHGDIWHUDVHULHVRIDWWDFNVOHDYH
more than eight injured.
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 $QJHUHG E\ JRYHUQPHQW·V GHFLVLRQ QRW WR EXLOG D XQLYHUVLW\ DV SOHGJHG LQ WKHLU
town, residents of Emjindini Township, Emjindini Trust and Sincobile Village 
organize a violent protest lasting several days, breaking shop windows and looting 
stores. Shops belonging to Pakistani nationals are especially targeted. Some 45 
persons are arrested, of whom 18 are minors.
 $QJHUHGDWQRWUHFHLYLQJ5'3KRXVHVUHVLGHQWVRI9LOMRHQVNURRQVWRQH ORRWDQG
burn down 20 shops belonging to Pakistani migrants. 
 6L[SROLFHPHQIURPWKH7DFWLFDO5HVSRQVH7HDP757DSSHDULQFRXUWIRUYLROHQWO\
assaulting Somali migrant Osman Nuur Mohamed. Mohamed succumbed to his 
injuries at Kwazakhele Police Station where he was taken after the assault. One 
TRT officer faces a charge of murder.
 6RPDOLPLJUDQWVVD\WKDW[HQRSKRELDLVRQWKHULVHDJDLQZLWKPRUHWKDQWHQ6RPDOL
shop owners having been assaulted and killed in less than one week. Another 
twenty traders have been violently robbed.
 $1&3URYLQFLDO6HFUHWDU\0MRQJLOHVD\VQXPEHURIIRUHLJQVSD]DVKRSVQHHGWREH
curbed because it contributes to tensions between locals and migrants and could 
result in additional xenophobic violence. 
 'XULQJSURWHVWWRGHPDQGEHWWHUKRXVLQJDQGOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQV ORFDOUHVLGHQWVRI
Botriver attack migrant-run shops and cause damage worth R100,000. Police urges 
traders to press charges against the perpetrators.
 6RPDOLEXVLQHVVPDQ$EGLNDGLU,VVH$EGXOODKLLVVKRWGHDGE\DUPHGLQWUXGHUVDWKLV
shop in Malmesbury Township. He is believed to be seventh Somali to be shot dead 
that week.
 $IWHU XQUHJLVWHUHG VWUHHW YHQGRUV DUH UHPRYHG IURP )DLUZD\V EXVLQHVVHV RZQHG
by Somali, Chinese, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Ethiopian migrants are attacked, 
raided and houses are set on fire in Botshabelo. Nearly 600 persons are displaced.
 7ZHQW\QLQHPLJUDQWUXQVSD]DVKRSVDUHDWWDFNHG LQ9DOKDOOD%LVKRSV/DYLVDQG
Mitchells Plain. Nine shops are gutted and twenty looted over several days. Somali, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants are affected.
 $IWHUPRUH WKDQPLJUDQWV DUH DVVDXOWHG DQGGLVSODFHG LQ:HVWHUQ&DSH DQG
Free State, rights groups say “country close to boiling point”. PASSOP blames the 
violence on the ANC’s new “Peace and Stability” document, saying it unfairly tar-
gets migrant businesses and demonizes refugees.
 3ROLFHLPSOHPHQW´2SHUDWLRQ+DUG6WLFNµLQ/LPSRSRSURYLQFHGXULQJZKLFKPRUH
than 500 spaza stores are raided and closed for operating without trading licenses. 
Allegedly, trading laws are “selectively enforced” to target migrant-run businesses. 
 $PQHVW\,QWHUQDWLRQDOVD\VWKHOLYHOLKRRGRIPDQ\UHIXJHHVLVEHLQJMHRSDUGL]HGE\
forced closures of migrant-run spaza shops.
 +HDYLO\DUPHGSHUVRQVORRWDQGEXUQVKRSVEHORQJLQJWR3RUWXJXHVHDQG&KLQHVH
migrants in several settlements like Boitekong and near Jabula Hostel. The Somali 
Association of SA says it has asked its members to leave area for safety. Reportedly, 
the violence is tied to anger over migrant employment in Anglo Platinum mines.
2013
 $1&·V UG QDWLRQDO FRQIHUHQFH UHVROXWLRQV· GRFXPHQW GHFODUHV WKDW LUUHJXODU
migrants pose “both an economic and security threat” to South Africa. 
 6RPDOLVKRSNHHSHU0RKDPPHG$EXEDNHU0R·DOLPLVVKRWGHDGE\XQNQRZQDVVDLO-
ants in his store in Wynberg. 
 6RPDOLVZHUHPXUGHUHGLQWKH:HVWHUQ&DSHLQWKHSUHYLRXV\HDUHVWLPDWHVWKH
Somali Community Board. “We are shocked [at] the endless killing of our nation-
als,” they say.
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 'XULQJ YLROHQW SURWHVWV DJDLQVW JRYHUQPHQW SODQV WR PHUJH 6DVROEXUJ DQG 3U\V
municipalities, migrant-owned shops are looted and set on fire in Zamdela and 
neighbouring Denysville and Koppies. Affected migrants say 60 shops are ransacked 
and destroyed. Eyewitnesses say police also engaged in looting.
 1LQHSHUVRQVDUHDUUHVWHGIRUUDQVDFNLQJPLJUDQWRZQHGVKRSVLQ.ZDQREXKOH$
store belonging to an Ethiopian migrant is also set on fire. Many storeowners flee 
the area and complain that the police response has been weak.
 =DPGHOD7RZQVKLSUHVLGHQWVVD\WKDW6RPDOL%DQJODGHVKLDQG3DNLVWDQLVKRSRZQ-
ers were attacked during protests because they do not contribute to local commu-
nity they profit from.
 0R]DPELFDQ WD[LGULYHU (PLGLR0DFLD GLHV LQ FXVWRG\ LQ'DYH\WRQ IURP VHYHUH
beating after being tied and dragged behind a police van. Eight police personnel are 
arrested.
 3ROLFH UHLQIRUFHPHQWV DUH FDOOHG LQ DIWHU PDQ\ VKRSV EHORQJLQJ WR PLJUDQWV DUH
looted in Kwanobuhle. Some shops are set on fire and migrants flee area. 
 7ZHOYHVKRSVDUHUDQVDFNHGLQ.ZDQREXKOHDIWHUWKHSROLFHWDNH6RPDOLWUDGHUVWR
police station to check their business permits. The police say it was part of a Home 
Affairs’ operation, but the department denies it. 
 )LYH6RXWK$IULFDQVDFFXVHGRIUREELQJ3DNLVWDQLDQG%DQJODGHVKLVKRSNHHSHUVLQ
Buhlebesizwe village in two separate incidents in mid-2011 are sentenced to serve 
terms of fifteen years each.
 7KH6RPDOL&RPPXQLW\%RDUGRI6RXWK$IULFDHVWLPDWHVWKDWPRUHWKDQRI
their compatriots have been killed in South Africa since 2004, many of them in 
Eastern and Western Cape provinces.
 $URXQG  6RPDOL 3DNLVWDQL DQG %DQJODGHVKL PLJUDQWV IURP 0LWFKHOO·V 3ODLQ




25-years’ prison sentence for robbing and killing Ethiopian migrant Thomas Ebamo. 
Ebamo died after being dragged behind a car with seatbelt tied around his neck. 
Judge deems it a “savage act of xenophobia.”
 $&RPPXQLW\SURWHVW LQ'HOPDVRYHUDODFNRI MREVWXUQVYLROHQWZLWKORRWLQJRI
migrant-owned stores. 74 shops are forcibly closed down.
 6$36 SHUVRQQHO VXFFHVVIXOO\ LQWHUYHQHZKHQ 6RPDOL VKRSNHHSHUV LQ 6RVKDQJXYH







officers at Ladana in Polokwane. 
 6RPDOLPLJUDQWLVVWDEEHGWRGHDWKDW*UHHQILHOGV
 6RPDOLVKRSRZQHULVNLOOHGZKHQUHVLGHQWVRI%RR\VHQ3DUNWXUQRQPLJUDQWVIRU
several days in a bid to rid the area of “criminal gangs”. More than 15 spaza shops 
are looted by protesting locals and migrants flee area. At least 11 persons are 
arrested. 
 6RPH  VSD]D VWRUHV DQG VPDOO EXVLQHVVHV EHORQJLQJ WR PLJUDQWV DUH UDLGHG LQ
Diepsloot after two Zimbabweans are allegedly shot dead by Somali shop owner. 
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Some 50 persons are arrested for public violence, housebreaking and possession of 
unlicensed firearms. Witnesses say that only shops belonging to Somalis, Ethiopians 
and Pakistanis are looted.
 )ROORZLQJ KHDY\ ORRWLQJ RI PLJUDQW VKRSV LQ 'LHSVORRW D ORFDO ZDUG FRXQFLORU
asks for the army to be called in to contain the violence but Gauteng Police 
Commissioner disagrees.
 0LJUDQWVOLYLQJLQ'LHSVORRWVD\WKH\IDFHUHJXODUYHUEDODEXVHIURPORFDOUHVLGHQWV
“they say go home and remove Mugabe. What are you doing in our country? Why 
are you taking our jobs and women?”
 -XVWLFH0LQLVWHU5DGHEHFRQWHQGVWKDWDWWDFNVRQIRUHLJQHUVLQ'LHSVORRWDUHDFWVRI
criminality and should not be seen as xenophobia: “I think the criminal activities 
perpetuated by some South Africans is a matter of grave concern. They are not a 
reflection of xenophobic attacks against foreigners.”
 *RYHUQPHQWGHHPV´VRFDOOHG[HQRSKRELFDWWDFNVµLQ'LHSVORRWDQGRWKHUDUHDVDV
“pure criminal activities.” 
 0LJUDQWVKRSVDUHORRWHGDQGSLOODJHGLQ2UDQJH)DUPDQGQHLJKERULQJ6HERNHQJ
informal settlement during a protest organized by the Workers and Socialist Party 
against the eviction of unauthorized RDP owners. Police advise migrants to leave 
area. Over 100 persons are arrested in Orange Farm. Residents say the violence was 
retaliation for the killing of a Sebokeng resident by Pakistani migrant but the police 
say no resident was killed. 
 3ROLFHUHFHLYHRQHKXQGUHGFRPSODLQWVRIORRWLQJDQGYDQGDOLVPRIPLJUDQWRZQHG
stores from the Vaal during service delivery protests.
 7KH*UHDWHU*DXWHQJ%XVLQHVV)RUXPGHQLHVKDYLQJDKDQGLQUHFHQWYLROHQFHEXW
says foreign-owned shops are “here to destroy local business and people” and insists 
all migrant traders should “go back home.” “If nothing is done about it, there will 
be war.” 
 5HVSRQGLQJ WR WZR VHSDUDWH LQFLGHQWV RI YLROHQFH LQ *DXWHQJ LQ UHFHQW ZHHNV
Police spokesperson Mnisi insists that “many South Africans are not xenophobic 
and many cases are merely crime.”
 0LJUDQWULJKWV·JURXSVVD\PDQ\LQFLGHQWVLQYROYLQJ[HQRSKRELDDUHQRORQJHUEHLQJ
reported by the South African media. 
 /+5 VWDWHV WKDW ILYH \HDUV DIWHU 0D\  DQWLPLJUDQW YLROHQFH [HQRSKRELF
attacks have not been quelled and recommendations made by the SAHRC to gov-
ernment not been implemented. An average of 238 incidents are reported to police 
each month, according to the UNHCR Xenophobia Hotline data.
 3$6623DUJXHVWKDWWKUHDWRI[HQRSKRELFYLROHQFHLVLQIOXHQFHGE\WKUHHIDFWRUV
increasing pace of deportations, apathy of trade unions and civil society groups to 
attacks on migrant businesses combined with “growing narrative of anti-immigrant 
rhetoric among politicians.”
 'XULQJSURWHVWVDJDLQVWSRRUPXQLFLSDOVHUYLFHVORFDOUHVLGHQWVORRWPLJUDQWRZQHG
shops in Maokeng and Kroonstad.
 6$+5& VWDWHV LW LV WURXEOHG E\ WKH UHFHQW IODUHXS RI [HQRSKRELF YLROHQFH LQ
Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. The Commission deploys a team to Diepsloot and 
Orange Farm to assess the situation and urges government to implement recom-
mendations made by them after the 2008 attacks.
 )LYHVKRSVRZQHGE\=LPEDEZHDQPLJUDQWVDUHUD]HGLQ0DUDSRQJVXEXUE
 &HOOSKRQH IRRWDJH VXUIDFHV VKRZLQJDQXQLGHQWLILHG6RPDOLPDQEHLQJ VWRQHG WR
death in Port Elizabeth while attempting to salvage items from his ransacked store. 
Victim is later identified as 25-year-old Abdi Nasir Mahmoud Good.
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 )ROORZLQJVHULHVRIDWWDFNVLQ'LHSVORRWDQG3RUW(OL]DEHWK6RPDOL3ULPH0LQLVWHU
Abdi Farah Shirdon writes “open letter” to South African government requesting 
“as a matter of urgency to intervene and contain this unnecessary and unfortunate 
violence” against Somali migrants living in South Africa.
 5HDFWLQJ WR WKH ODWHVW ERXW RI YLROHQFH DJDLQVW IRUHLJQHUV WKH 6RXWK $IULFDQ
Cabinet states it is “cautious not to label this violence as xenophobia as preliminary 
evidence indicates that these acts may be driven primarily by criminality.”
 3UHVLGHQW=XPDWHOOV3DUOLDPHQWWKDW´0DQ\6RXWK$IULFDQVSURWHFWHGWKHIRUHLJQ-
ers and I had an opportunity to meet with them in and around Pretoria and East 
Rand. They were very clear that some of them were saying, ‘please don’t touch 
the foreigners’. I think even with some incidents that happened in Johannesburg, 
[there] was a clear division, so you can’t say [that] xenophobia is such a huge prob-
lem in South Africa.”
 /+5 VD\V JRYHUQPHQW GHQLDO RI [HQRSKRELD LV UHDOO\ GLVWXUELQJ JLYHQ WKH UHDOLW\
that violent attacks on migrants persist. They observe that hate crime legislation 
which has been on the back burner for several years would go far in proving govern-
ment’s commitment to seriously address xenophobia. 
 )RUHLJQRZQHG VKRSV DUH WDUJHWHG DQG ORRWHG GXULQJ VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\ SURWHVWV LQ
Gauteng, including Sebokeng, Evaton, Orange Farm and Lakeside townships.
 81+&5 VD\V LW LV ´H[WUHPHO\ FRQFHUQHGµ DERXW UHFHQW HSLVRGHV RI [HQRSKRELF
violence in Gauteng and Eastern Cape, involving refugees and asylum seekers as 
victims. Urges government to send out strong, clear message opposing it.
 'XULQJPHHWLQJZLWKKLV6RPDOLDQFRXQWHUSDUWLQ3UHWRULD,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV
and Cooperation Deputy Minister Ebrahim assures that Somali refugees will “have 
a safe home” in South Africa.
 0LJUDQWWUDGHUVIURP/LPSRSRSHWLWLRQ1RUWK*DXWHQJ+LJK&RXUWFODLPLQJWKH\DUH
prevented from running their businesses by province’s economic development, envi-
ronment and tourism departments who refuse to issue them with trading licenses.
 (WKLRSLDQWUDGHU'HVVWD%HMHJRLVNLOOHGDW&DWR&UHVWDQGDQRWKHUPLJUDQWLQMXUHG
by shooting. A third Ethiopian migrant survives different attack on his shop. Local 






table country and welcoming to foreigners.” 
 $VKRRWLQJLQFLGHQWLQYROYLQJD6RPDOLVKRSNHHSHULQ'XGX]D*DXWHQJUHVXOWVLQ
gangs of youth damaging and razing 200 shops run by Somali, Ethiopian, Eritrean 
and Bangladeshi migrants. Some 800 migrants are displaced and five persons arrest-
ed for public violence and possession of stolen goods. Duduza township migrant 
traders say they have lost stock and other property worth thousands of Rands from 
looting.
 0RUH WKDQ  VKRSV RZQHG E\ 6RPDOL UHIXJHHV DUH ORRWHG GXULQJ IRXU GD\V RI
violence after Somali shopkeeper kills South African boy in Port Elizabeth. Looting 
is reported in areas like Kwadwesi, KwaZakhele, Missionvale, Swartkops, New 
Brighton and Motherwell. Local police say motive for attack is “not xenophobic in 
nature”, but “a criminal element that has seized an opportunity.” 
 0LJUDQWWUDGHUVLQ'XGX]DDFFXVHORFDOFRXQFLORU7KDER0RWDXQJRIVWRNLQJ[HQR-
phobic violence and soliciting bribes to guarantee their safety. 





traders in Duduza: “We strongly condemn violence on foreign nationals as we 
equally condemn violence on South Africans.”
 0LJUDQWV KROG D SURWHVW LQ1LJHO RXWVLGHPDJLVWUDWH·V FRXUW RSSRVLQJ JUDQWLQJ RI
bail to Councilor Thabo Motaung. Protestors say he organized several attacks on 
migrants.
 7KH3UHWRULD+LJK&RXUWUXOHVDJDLQVWDQDSSOLFDWLRQILOHGE\WKH6RPDOL$VVRFLDWLRQ
of South Africa, Ethiopian Community of SA and other groups. Judge Ranchod 
says he is not satisfied that migrants are being discriminated against. He adds that 
restrictions on the right to trade are acceptable, recognized internationally and by 
Constitutional and appeal courts.
 7KH -RKDQQHVEXUJ +LJK &RXUW GLUHFWV (NXUKXOHQL 0XQLFLSDOLW\ WR DGGUHVV WKH
needs of victims of xenophobic violence by ensuring their personal safety and that 
of their property. It declares Ekurhuleni Township a “disaster zone”. The ruling 
follows attacks against Somali, Bangladeshi and Ethiopian migrants in Duduza and 
surrounding townships in recent months.
 $6RPDOLRZQHGVKRSLVDWWDFNHGDQGORRWHGLQ'XGX]DDIWHUUHVLGHQWVKROGPHHW-
ing to allow migrants to return to township. They were chased away in August.
 $W WKH QDWLRQDO 600(V VXPPLW LQ 0SXPDODQJD 'HSXW\ 7UDGH DQG ,QGXVWU\
Elizabeth Thabethe states that the “scourge of South Africans selling and renting 
their businesses to foreigners” hampers growth of South African entrepreneurship. 
“You still find many spazas with African names, but when you go in to buy, you find 
your Mohameds, and most of them are not even registered,” she adds.
 $PDUFK WR:HVWHUQ&DSH =LOOH·V RIILFH GHPDQGLQJ EHWWHU IDFLOLWLHV OLNH ODQG IRU
housing and improved sanitation turns violent. Some protestors ransack migrant 
traders’ stalls. Vendors claim the perpetrators told them: “You are a foreigner, 
we’re going to steal from you” and “Makwerekwere, hambani khaya [foreigners, go 
home]”. 
 3ROLFH LQYHVWLJDWH WKHUHFHQWGHDWKRI(WKLRSLDQPLJUDQW$VHIH(ULVH/RPEDER LQ
Pietermaritzburg. He was killed after the store where he worked was petrol-bombed 
in France Township. Five persons are arrested.
 0LJUDQWVLQ'XGX]DVD\GHVSLWHDUXOLQJJUDQWLQJWKHPSURWHFWLRQWKH\DUHEHLQJ
attacked again upon their return. 
 7ZR%DQJODGHVKLVKRSRZQHUVDUHEOXGJHRQHGWRGHDWK LQWKHLU VKRS LQ0DQDPD
Kgotheng Village near Mogwase. 
 $IWHUWKHSROLFHDQG5HG$QWVUHPRYHXQDXWKRUL]HGHOHFWULFLW\FRQQHFWLRQVIURP
Imbeliseni informal settlement, the residents organize a violent protest during 
which migrant-owned shops are looted. 
 $QJU\ DW WKH SROLFH IDLOXUH WR DUUHVW VXVSHFWV LQ WKH NLGQDSSLQJ RI D VL[\HDUROG
child, residents set houses and shops on fire in Setlagole. Three migrant-owned 
shops are looted. 
 0XVLQD DQG*UHDWHU 7XEDWVHPXQLFLSDOLWLHV VKXW GRZQ VRPH  EXVLQHVVHV UXQ
by refugees and asylum-seekers. Migrant shopkeepers are allowed to present their 
case to the Supreme Court of Appeal challenging unauthorized closure by police of 
informal businesses under “Operation Hardstick”.
 /RFDO UHVLGHQWV EXUQ GRZQ ILYH =LPEDEZHDQRZQHG VKRSV WZR KRXVHV DQG WZR
vehicles in Liphalale town. The local business forum, accusing migrants of unfair 
competition and crime, is believed to have instigated these attacks.
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 0R]DPELFDQIHPDOHWUDGHULVURXJKHGXSLQ-RKDQQHVEXUJDQGYHUEDOO\DEXVHGE\
police personnel in latest development of “Operation Clean Sweep”, the city’s pro-
ject to evict informal traders from inner city areas.
 'HVSLWHWKHHQRUPRXVYDOXHRILQIRUPDOFURVVERUGHUWUDGHHVWLPDWHGWREHDURXQG
$17.6 billion for SADC countries, women migrants who constitute 70 percent of 
traders face many challenges, including harassment, soliciting of bribes and exploi-
tation by border officials. 
 6RPDOLUHIXJHHVIHHOWKH\DUHEHLQJWDUJHWHGZLWKLPSXQLW\LQWKHFRXQWU\7KH\VD\
returning to their war-torn country is preferable to animosity and resentment faced 
on daily basis in South Africa. 
 (WKLRSLDQ9LJLVW&KXIDPMRDQGKHUPRQWKEDE\DUHJXQQHGGRZQRXWVLGHKHU
husband’s shop in Everest at Springs outside Johannesburg. 
 6RPDOLRZQHGVKRSLVORRWHGE\DJDQJRI\RXWKVLQ/LQGHODQL
2014
 $IWHU DPDQ LV IRXQGGHDG LQ DPLJUDQWRZQHG WXFN VKRS LQ:LJJLQVQHDU&DWR
Manor, local residents loot and destroy it.
 5HVLGHQWV RI -LND -RH LQIRUPDO VHWWOHPHQW EODPH PLJUDQWV PDQ\ RI WKHP IURP
Malawi, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Mozambique, for death of another South African, 
destroying their homes and attacking them with pangas, knives, steel pipes and 
sticks.
 +RPH$IIDLUV0LQLVWHU3DQGRUDVVHUWV6RXWK$IULFDLVYHU\KRVSLWDEOHWRLPPLJUDQWV
and refugees: “It would be difficult to find a country in the UN as welcoming as our 
country.”
 'XULQJ GD\ RI YLROHQW SURWHVWV LQ 7]DQHHQ PLJUDQWRZQHG VKRSV DUH ORRWHG LQ
Kubjana and Relela. 
 7VKZDQHSROLFHRIILFHUSOHDGVJXLOW\WRNLGQDSSLQJDQGDVVDXOWLQJVL[=LPEDEZHDQ
migrants in 2010, including unsolved disappearance of teenager. LHR says case is 
related to “rise in targeting of informal traders” in Pretoria and Johannesburg. 
 .KD\HOLWVKD &RPPLVVLRQ LQYHVWLJDWLQJ SROLFH FRQGXFW LV LQIRUPHG WKDW PLJUDQWV
regularly face abuse at hands of police and their human rights are often ignored. 
Somali shopkeepers are regularly extorted and mistreated by police after episodes 
of armed robberies, including stealing cash from them.
 $PDQGOD:HWKX:RUNHUV·8QLRQPHPEHUV UDQVDFNPDQ\ 3DNLVWDQL %DQJODGHVKL
and Chinese-owned shops in Mthatha.
 'XULQJYLROHQWVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\SURWHVWVPRUHWKDQSHUVRQVYDQGDOL]HLQIRU-
mal traders’ stalls at Ekangala near Pretoria.
 7ZRPLJUDQWRZQHGVKRSVDUHORRWHGDQGDVKRSNHHSHULQMXUHGDW0DMDNDQHQJGXU-
ing violent service delivery protests in Gauteng and parts of North West.
 3URWHVWLQJ WKHLU XQPHW GHPDQG IRU KRXVLQJ IURP1HOVRQ0DQGHOD PXQLFLSDOLW\
hundreds of residents of Kamesh set fire to houses and raid migrant-run stores in 
Uitenhage.
 5HVLGHQWV RI .ZDODQJD 7RZQVKLS LQ 8LWHQKDJH ORRW PLJUDQWUXQ VKRSV GXULQJ D
week of violent protest over housing.
 0RUHWKDQILIWHHQPLJUDQWVKRSVDQGWKUHHYHKLFOHVDUHORRWHGDQGRQHWRUFKHGLQ
Refilwe Township outside Pretoria.
 0LJUDQWRZQHGVKRSVDUHORRWHGGXULQJDVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\SURWHVWLQ6RZHWR3ROLFH
escort migrants away from area with their goods.
 6L[W\WKUHHSHRSOHDUHDUUHVWHGLQ0ROHQWODQHYLOODJHLQ/LPSRSRIRUUDQVDFNLQJDQG
torching five Chinese-owned shops.
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 $QXPEHURIPLJUDQWRZQHGVKRSVDUHORRWHGGXULQJDVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\SURWHVWDW
Setlagole outside Mahikeng, North West province. Twenty persons are arrested, 
including seven for possession of stolen goods. 
 7KLUW\ILYHSHUVRQVDUHDUUHVWHGLQ-RKDQQHVEXUJIRUSXEOLFYLROHQFHDIWHUWKH\EDU-
ricade roads, burn tires, and loot several migrant-run shops.
 'XULQJSXEOLFSURWHVWGHPDQGLQJLPSURYHGPXQLFLSDOVHUYLFHV6HWODJROHUHVLGHQWV
raid several migrant-owned shops. Seven persons are arrested for possession of sto-
len goods.
 6HYHUDO6RPDOLRZQHG VKRSVDUHYDQGDOL]HGDQG ORRWHG LQ3LHQDDU0SXPDODQJD
after a migrant shopkeeper kills local resident during altercation. Somali migrants 
say police are not doing enough to protect them and arrived after their stock was 
already looted.
 7KLUW\ILYHSHUVRQVDUHKHOGLQFXVWRG\LQ.DQDQD1RUWK:HVWSURYLQFHIRUSXEOLF
violence, arson and malicious damage to property after protesters destroy local 
municipal offices and loot several migrant-owned shops. Two stores are set on fire.
 7HQ LPPLJUDQWV UHFHLYHG LQMXULHV DQG WZHQW\ILYH VKRSV DUH ORRWHG E\ RUJDQL]HG
gangs in Johannesburg and Pretoria. The President of the Nigerian Union in South 
Africa declares that commercial taxi drivers led the attacks in Johannesburg.
 'XULQJ VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\ SURWHVWV LQ /LPSRSRPDQ\ VSD]D VKRSV RZQHG E\ LPPL-
grants are looted in villages around Maake. Twenty persons are arrested.
 6KRSVEHORQJLQJWRIRUHLJQHUVDUHUDQVDFNHGDQGGDPDJHGLQ%RLWXPHORQJ7RZQVKLS
in Bloemhof during protests against poor service delivery and corruption in local 
government. As violence spreads to neighboring areas, five spaza shops are report-
edly looted and torched in Wolmaranstadt in nearby Maquassi Hills Municipality.
 6RPDOL VKRSNHHSHU0RKDPHG-HHOH LV VKRWGHDG LQ3RUW(OL]DEHWKE\XQLGHQWLILHG
persons and his store’s contents are stolen.
 $1&6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO0DQWDVKHVD\VJRYHUQPHQWLVFRQFHUQHGDERXWGLVDSSHDU-
ing South African small businesses that are being “swallowed by foreign migrants: 
“If you go to Soweto, corner shops have been taken over by foreigners. We must do 
something about it” Mantashe informs a campaign rally at Eldorado Park South in 
Johannesburg. 
 8QLGHQWLILHG JXQPHQ NLOO WZR 6RPDOL WUDGHUV 6KDIL+DVVDQ1RXU DQG$EGLULVDN
Abdilahi Hassan. inside their store outside Johannesburg at Mathuli district and 
steal money and other valuables.
 /RFDOUHVLGHQWVRI*LOHDG/LPSRSRDWWDFNPLJUDQWVDQGORRWWKHLUVKRSVDIWHUEODP-
ing them for rising crime.
 6RPHPLJUDQWRZQHG VKRSVDUHDWWDFNHGE\DUPHG\RXWK IRU VHYHUDOGD\VDW
Mamelodi East and West after fight between migrant shopkeeper and local turns 
violent. Three migrants are killed, more than dozen are injured and the remainder 
escape to Pretoria. They complain that police checked their immigration permits 
instead of protecting their lives and property. Provincial police spokesperson 
Mofokeng says attacks are not xenophobic: “criminal elements are at play here. 
Young lawless people are on the loose, and we are investigating with the aim of 
arresting them.”
 $IULFDQ'LDVSRUD)RUXPFULWLFL]HVSROLFHIRUYHULI\LQJSHUPLWVRIDIIHFWHGPLJUDQWV
during Mamelodi attacks: “what is more urgent for the SAPS, saving lives or check-
ing papers? The apparent impunity with which perpetrators commit these acts of 
xenophobia and government’s denial that these shameful events take place or are 
xenophobic could possibly be the reason why attacks are multiplying.”
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